These people also have a lot of antipathy for Peter Singer (for defending a parental right to terminate extremely disabled babies)
FWIW, this understates his position and the controversy. It’s not just “extremely” disabled babies, but infants with basically any disability, due to a replaceability argument.
I don’t expect disability rights activists to have much effect on selection and gene editing, though.
FWIW, this understates his position and the controversy. It’s not just “extremely” disabled babies, but infants with basically any disability, due to a replaceability argument.
Can you cite this? I heard him talk about this in public (in Germany) and he focused strongly on the “extremely disabled” aspect. I’d be interested in how he makes the more general case, and how strongly he makes it.
This article is quite outdated, but it gives a lot of interesting information. I especially enjoyed the paragraphs about his friendship with a profoundly disabled woman, his regular donations to a disability charity, and his decisions in caring for his mother with Alzheimer’s (all in the context of him essentially not believing that many people with disabilities have worthwhile lives and/or should be considered “persons”.) Ignore the title. https://www.michaelspecter.com/1999/09/the-dangerous-philosopher/
all in the context of him essentially not believing that many people with disabilities have worthwhile lives and/or should be considered “persons”.
I think he doesn’t (or didn’t) believe infants are persons, regardless of disability status, and he argues that parents should be able to have their infant euthanized for any disability like they should be able to have their fetus aborted for any disability.
See this excerpt from Practical Ethics. Also, a specific quote from there:
In any case, the position taken here does not imply that it would be better that no people born with severe disabilities should survive; it implies only that the parents of such infants should be able to make this decision. Nor does this imply lack of respect or equal consideration for people with disabilities who are now living their own lives in accordance with their own wishes. As we saw at the end of Chapter 2, the principle of equal consideration of interests rejects any discounting of the interests of people on grounds of disability.
From Practical Ethics. (It keeps going after this, but this is the basic argument.)
Given these facts, suppose that a newborn baby is diagnosed as a haemophiliac. The parents, daunted by the prospect of bringing up a child with this condition, are not anxious for him to live. Could euthanasia be defended here? Our first reaction may well be a firm ‘no’, for the infant can be expected to have a life that is worth living, even if not quite as good as that of a normal baby. The ‘prior existence’ version of utilitarianism sup- ports this judgment. The infant exists. His life can be expected to contain a positive balance of happiness over misery. To kill him would deprive him of this positive balance of happiness. Therefore it would be wrong.
On the ‘total’ version of utilitarianism, however, we cannot reach a decision on the basis of this information alone. The total view makes it necessary to ask whether the death of the haemophiliac infant would lead to the creation of another being who would not otherwise have existed. In other words, if the haemophiliac child is killed, will his parents have another child whom they would not have if the haemophiliac child lives? If they would, is the second child likely to have a better life than the one killed?
Often it will be possible to answer both these questions affinnatively. A woman may plan to have two children. If one dies while she is of child-bearing age, she may conceive another in its place. Suppose a woman planning to have two children has one normal child, and then gives birth to a haemophiliac child. The burden of caring for that child may make it impossible for her to cope with a third child; but if the disabled child were to die, she would have another. It is also plausible to suppose that the prospects of a happy life are better for a normal child than for a haemophiliac.
When the death of a disabled infant will lead to the birth of another infant with better prospects of a happy life, the total amount of happiness will be greater if the disabled infant is killed. The loss of happy life for the first infant is outweighed by the gain of a happier life for the second. Therefore, if killing the haemophiliac infant has no adverse effect on others, it would, according to the total view, be right to kill him.
I think too many people ignore the “parents” part of singer’s argument. If a parent is willing to kill their child, then either 1. That’s a super f-ed up parent, or 2. it probably is the compassionate thing to do. Anyone who jumps to comparisons to racist euthanasia programs is missing the point entirely, because the kid’s own parents are not going to act the same as some random Old South judge who’s headed to the Klan rally after court gets out.
FWIW, this understates his position and the controversy. It’s not just “extremely” disabled babies, but infants with basically any disability, due to a replaceability argument.
I don’t expect disability rights activists to have much effect on selection and gene editing, though.
Can you cite this? I heard him talk about this in public (in Germany) and he focused strongly on the “extremely disabled” aspect. I’d be interested in how he makes the more general case, and how strongly he makes it.
This article is quite outdated, but it gives a lot of interesting information. I especially enjoyed the paragraphs about his friendship with a profoundly disabled woman, his regular donations to a disability charity, and his decisions in caring for his mother with Alzheimer’s (all in the context of him essentially not believing that many people with disabilities have worthwhile lives and/or should be considered “persons”.) Ignore the title. https://www.michaelspecter.com/1999/09/the-dangerous-philosopher/
I think he doesn’t (or didn’t) believe infants are persons, regardless of disability status, and he argues that parents should be able to have their infant euthanized for any disability like they should be able to have their fetus aborted for any disability.
See this excerpt from Practical Ethics. Also, a specific quote from there:
From Practical Ethics. (It keeps going after this, but this is the basic argument.)
I think too many people ignore the “parents” part of singer’s argument. If a parent is willing to kill their child, then either 1. That’s a super f-ed up parent, or 2. it probably is the compassionate thing to do. Anyone who jumps to comparisons to racist euthanasia programs is missing the point entirely, because the kid’s own parents are not going to act the same as some random Old South judge who’s headed to the Klan rally after court gets out.