What is the mean moral moral weight of animals (e.g. chickens, fish, and insects) relative to humans?
What do you make of the argument that, since there is a material probability (e.g. 10 %) of the moral weight being larger than 1 (e.g. because animals might have more experiences per unit time), the mean moral weight is close to 1 (e.g. larger than 10 % * 1 = 0.1)?
Which farmed and wild animals, if any, have net positive lives?
What is the net impact of following a plant-based diet (in particular, what is its sign)?
Pros:
Increase in the welfare of farmed animals (assuming they have net negative lives, less farmed animals implies more welfare).
Less GHG emissions.
Expansion of the moral circle.
Cons:
Decrease in the welfare of wild animals (assuming they have net negative lives, more wild animals implies less welfare).
Less civilisation resilience (consuming animals requires an oversized agricultural system, which could be helpful in the event of an agrivultural shortfall, since there is margin to redirect crops from animals to humans).
Global health and development:
What is the effect of the best global health and development interventions (e.g. GiveWell’s top charities) on population size?
What is the effect of changing the population size on the value of the longterm future?
Why have the above questions (apparently) not been a research priority, given they seem crucial considerations for assessing the value (in fact, the sign) of global health and development interventions (assuming most of the impact of such interventions are indirect longterm effects)?
How does the meat-eater problem affect the effectiveness of global health and development interventions?
The negative utility of poultry lives may exceed the utility of human lives for the mean country (I have estimated the ratio to be 2 here).
This ratio was obtained for a moral weight of chickens relative to humans of 2 (which most people think is too high, but I guess is reasonable). However, even for a smaller moral weight, it looks like corporate campaigns for chickens welfare are still much more effective.
If this is indeed the case, are global health and development interventions more prioritised than the above suggests due to indirect longterm effects (which were not factored into the above calculation)?
Animal welfare:
What is the mean moral moral weight of animals (e.g. chickens, fish, and insects) relative to humans?
What do you make of the argument that, since there is a material probability (e.g. 10 %) of the moral weight being larger than 1 (e.g. because animals might have more experiences per unit time), the mean moral weight is close to 1 (e.g. larger than 10 % * 1 = 0.1)?
Which farmed and wild animals, if any, have net positive lives?
What is the net impact of following a plant-based diet (in particular, what is its sign)?
Pros:
Increase in the welfare of farmed animals (assuming they have net negative lives, less farmed animals implies more welfare).
Less GHG emissions.
Expansion of the moral circle.
Cons:
Decrease in the welfare of wild animals (assuming they have net negative lives, more wild animals implies less welfare).
Less civilisation resilience (consuming animals requires an oversized agricultural system, which could be helpful in the event of an agrivultural shortfall, since there is margin to redirect crops from animals to humans).
Global health and development:
What is the effect of the best global health and development interventions (e.g. GiveWell’s top charities) on population size?
What is the effect of changing the population size on the value of the longterm future?
Why have the above questions (apparently) not been a research priority, given they seem crucial considerations for assessing the value (in fact, the sign) of global health and development interventions (assuming most of the impact of such interventions are indirect longterm effects)?
How does the meat-eater problem affect the effectiveness of global health and development interventions?
The negative utility of poultry lives may exceed the utility of human lives for the mean country (I have estimated the ratio to be 2 here).
Cause priorisation:
Corporate campaigns for chicken welfare are 10,000 times as effective as GiveWell’s Maximum Impact Fund?
This ratio was obtained for a moral weight of chickens relative to humans of 2 (which most people think is too high, but I guess is reasonable). However, even for a smaller moral weight, it looks like corporate campaigns for chickens welfare are still much more effective.
If this is indeed the case, are global health and development interventions more prioritised than the above suggests due to indirect longterm effects (which were not factored into the above calculation)?