Your reply to Ericās fourth objection makes an important point that I havenāt seen mentioned before:
By contrast, I think thereās a much more credible risk that defenders of conventional morality may use dismissive rhetoric about āgrandiose fantasiesā (etc.) to discourage other conventional thinkers from taking longtermism and existential risks as seriously as they ought, on the merits, to take them. (I donāt accuse Schwitzgebel, in particular, of this. He grants that most people unduly neglect the importance of existential risk reduction. But I do find that this kind of rhetoric is troublingly common amongst critics of longtermism, and I donāt think itās warranted or helpful in any way.)
A view, of course, can be true even if defending it in public is expected to have bad consequences. But if we are going to consider the consequences of publicly defending a view in our evaluation of it, it seems we should also consider the consequences of publicly objecting to that view when evaluating those objections.
I blogged a response to Schwitzgebelās four objections, here. But Iād welcome any suggestions for better responses!
Your reply to Ericās fourth objection makes an important point that I havenāt seen mentioned before:
A view, of course, can be true even if defending it in public is expected to have bad consequences. But if we are going to consider the consequences of publicly defending a view in our evaluation of it, it seems we should also consider the consequences of publicly objecting to that view when evaluating those objections.