Worldview Diversification (Karnofksy, 2016): Divide your resources across different theoretical âbucketsâ in proportion to your confidence in each theory, then choose the best option for each âbucketâ. For example, if you have 30% credence in deprivationism and 100% credence that the neutral point is below one, you should award 30% of your resources to AMF and the rest to StrongMinds.
It is worth noting the portfolio approach corresponding to worldview diversification applies to the allocation of resources of the community as a whole, as far as I understand. So, even if one has â30% credence in deprivationism and 100% credence that the neutral point is below oneâ, assuming AMF (or other life-saving interventions which score highly under deprivationist views) currently receives more than 30 % of resources, one could reasonably direct (at the current margin) all donations to StrongMinds (or other life-improving interventions which score highly under epicurean views).
I also wonder whether GiveWellâs moral weights being majorly determined by its donors (60 %) has the intention of capturing other effects besides those directly related to the death of the person. For example, Wilde 2019 analyses the effect of bednets on fertility, concluding:
[Abstract:] The effect on fertility is positive only temporarily â lasting only 1-3 years after the beginning of the ITN distribution programs â and then becomes negative. Taken together, these results suggest the ITN distribution campaigns may have caused fertility to increase unexpectedly and temporarily, or that these increases may just be a tempo effect â changes in fertility timing which do not lead to increased completed fertility
[Conclusion:] In contrast, our findings do not support the contention that erosion of international funding for malaria control, specifically of ITNs, would lead to higher fertility rates in the short-run. While our results are suggestive that this may be the case for long-run fertility, we show the exact opposite for the short-run
If the results are suggestive that decreasing ITNs leads to higher long-run fertility, AMF would tend to decrease longterm fertility. This would tend to decrease the future population size, but it is unclear whether this is good or bad.
I guess population size considerations did not play much of a role on the moral weight answers of GiveWellâs donors. However, such considerations could play a major role in determining the longterm cost-effectiveness of life-saving interventions, so they should arguably be investigated.
It is worth noting the portfolio approach corresponding to worldview diversification applies to the allocation of resources of the community as a whole, as far as I understand.
It does? Says who? And why does it? Given that attempts there have been, as far as I can tell, almost nil attempts to think through the worldview diversification approachâdespite it being appealed to in decision-making for many yearsâit strikes me as an open question about how it should be understood. I see moral uncertainty as asking a first-personal questionâwhat should I do, given my beliefs about morality?
I also wonder whether GiveWellâs moral weights being majorly determined by its donors (60 %) has the intention of capturing other effects besides those directly related to the death of the person
Ah, I too used to spend many hours wondering what GiveWell really thought about things. But now I am a man, I have put away such childish things.
The decision of which interventions to support depends on their marginal cost-effectiveness, which in turn depends on the amount of resources invested in the interventions globally, not just by me.
Given that attempts there have been, as far as I can tell, almost nil attempts to think through the worldview diversification approachâdespite it being appealed to in decision-making for many yearsâit strikes me as an open question about how it should be understood.
I agree the worldview diversification approach is quite ad hoc, and I much prefer the softmax approach suggested here by Jan Kulveit and Gavin Leech.
Ah, I too used to spend many hours wondering what GiveWell really thought about things. But now I am a man, I have put away such childish things.
I think it is useful to understand the reasoning behind certain assumptions (e.g. giving large weight to donorsâ moral weights), because they may inform our own analyses. However, one should still question whether the reasoning makes sense.
Thanks for the analysis!
It is worth noting the portfolio approach corresponding to worldview diversification applies to the allocation of resources of the community as a whole, as far as I understand. So, even if one has â30% credence in deprivationism and 100% credence that the neutral point is below oneâ, assuming AMF (or other life-saving interventions which score highly under deprivationist views) currently receives more than 30 % of resources, one could reasonably direct (at the current margin) all donations to StrongMinds (or other life-improving interventions which score highly under epicurean views).
I also wonder whether GiveWellâs moral weights being majorly determined by its donors (60 %) has the intention of capturing other effects besides those directly related to the death of the person. For example, Wilde 2019 analyses the effect of bednets on fertility, concluding:
If the results are suggestive that decreasing ITNs leads to higher long-run fertility, AMF would tend to decrease longterm fertility. This would tend to decrease the future population size, but it is unclear whether this is good or bad.
I guess population size considerations did not play much of a role on the moral weight answers of GiveWellâs donors. However, such considerations could play a major role in determining the longterm cost-effectiveness of life-saving interventions, so they should arguably be investigated.
It does? Says who? And why does it? Given that attempts there have been, as far as I can tell, almost nil attempts to think through the worldview diversification approachâdespite it being appealed to in decision-making for many yearsâit strikes me as an open question about how it should be understood. I see moral uncertainty as asking a first-personal questionâwhat should I do, given my beliefs about morality?
Ah, I too used to spend many hours wondering what GiveWell really thought about things. But now I am a man, I have put away such childish things.
Hi Michael,
Thanks for the reply!
The decision of which interventions to support depends on their marginal cost-effectiveness, which in turn depends on the amount of resources invested in the interventions globally, not just by me.
I agree the worldview diversification approach is quite ad hoc, and I much prefer the softmax approach suggested here by Jan Kulveit and Gavin Leech.
I think it is useful to understand the reasoning behind certain assumptions (e.g. giving large weight to donorsâ moral weights), because they may inform our own analyses. However, one should still question whether the reasoning makes sense.