Update: I just finished this book. It was as advertised: a concise, technical and sometimes challenging experience of moral philosophy, at the edge of my non-specialist understanding, but I really appreciated it. A couple of really important takeaways for me:
The robustness of minimalist axiologies to various instantiations of the Repugnant Conclusion, especially under (non-sharp) lexicality.
A willingness to “bite the bullet” in certain cases, in particular the Archimedean minimalist ‘Reverse Repugnant Conclusion’ (i.e. it’s better to add lots of bad lives, to slightly reduce the unbearable suffering of enough other bad lives) and the axiological ‘perfection’ of an empty world (matched only by one in which all lives are completely untroubled).
Relatedly, a willingness to “spit the bullet back out” where negative utilitarianism/minimalist views have been maligned, misrepresented or generally underdone, including by high-profile folks within EA whom I don’t think have publicly changed their positions.
Thank you for writing this, Teo, and well done again! I hope to write a longer-form summary of the ideas, both for myself and others, as I think there’s a great deal of value here.
Just to clarify on #2: To “bite the bullet” in the case of the RRC (Figure 4.7) does not entail reducing unbearable suffering. Instead, it entails reducing mild discomfort for many lives at the cost of adding unbearable suffering for others. When it comes to the question of how to prioritize between mild vs. severe harms, accepting these kinds of (Archimedean) tradeoffs is just one option. As you allude to in #1, the other options include looking into lexical views, such as those that would—all else equal—prioritize the reduction of unbearable suffering over any amount of mild (or wholly bearable) discomfort.
Update: I just finished this book. It was as advertised: a concise, technical and sometimes challenging experience of moral philosophy, at the edge of my non-specialist understanding, but I really appreciated it. A couple of really important takeaways for me:
The robustness of minimalist axiologies to various instantiations of the Repugnant Conclusion, especially under (non-sharp) lexicality.
A willingness to “bite the bullet” in certain cases, in particular the Archimedean minimalist ‘Reverse Repugnant Conclusion’ (i.e. it’s better to add lots of bad lives, to slightly reduce the unbearable suffering of enough other bad lives) and the axiological ‘perfection’ of an empty world (matched only by one in which all lives are completely untroubled).
Relatedly, a willingness to “spit the bullet back out” where negative utilitarianism/minimalist views have been maligned, misrepresented or generally underdone, including by high-profile folks within EA whom I don’t think have publicly changed their positions.
Thank you for writing this, Teo, and well done again! I hope to write a longer-form summary of the ideas, both for myself and others, as I think there’s a great deal of value here.
Thank you, that’s great to hear!
Just to clarify on #2: To “bite the bullet” in the case of the RRC (Figure 4.7) does not entail reducing unbearable suffering. Instead, it entails reducing mild discomfort for many lives at the cost of adding unbearable suffering for others. When it comes to the question of how to prioritize between mild vs. severe harms, accepting these kinds of (Archimedean) tradeoffs is just one option. As you allude to in #1, the other options include looking into lexical views, such as those that would—all else equal—prioritize the reduction of unbearable suffering over any amount of mild (or wholly bearable) discomfort.
Thanks for correcting me! I’ve reviewed my notes, and made some additional points to ensure I don’t make the mistake again.
Cool, no problem! I admit that it was often left quite abstract what the different parts of the diagrams symbolize.