I think both terms have their advantages. The same question has actually come up before. Here is what I replied the first time it came up:
I think ‘minimalist’ does also work [in the other sense as well], because it seems to me that offsetting axiologies add further assumptions on top of those that are entailed by the offsetting and the minimalist axiologies. For example, my series tends to explore welfarist minimalist axiologies that assume only some single disvalue (such as suffering, or craving, or disturbance), with no second value entity that would correspond to a positive counterpart to this first one (cf. Vinding, 2022). By comparison, offsetting axiologies such as classical utilitarianism are arguably dualistic in that they assume two different value entities with opposite signs. And monism is arguably a theoretically desirable feature given the problem of value incommensurability between multiple intrinsic (dis)values.
For me, this aspect of value commensurability and theoretical parsimony is a major reason to favor purely minimalist axiologies over ‘negative-leaning’ ones. So the descriptor ‘minimalist’ can refer to minimalism regarding how many fundamental assumptions a theory requires.
I should add that we ultimately decided to reduce the emphasis on value commensurability in this book, because the value commensurability argument for minimalist views was not so centrally relevant here, wasn’t laid out in sufficient detail yet, and might work better as its own separate argument at some point. But the book still refers to it in a few places.
Additionally, we reduced the emphasis on monism because many of the book’s main points apply just as well to pluralist minimalist views which assume multiple intrinsic disvalues. Relatedly, I think the descriptor ‘minimizing’ sounds good and makes sense for consequentialist minimalist views in particular, but I imagine it might also sound too married to the kind of optimizing or systematizing mindset that may be typical of consequentialist thinking, at least to some people who might instead favor views like minimalist virtue ethics or minimalist care ethics without making consequentialism the centrally relevant component of their ethical views. (Thus, I suppose that ‘minimalist’ is a more neutral descriptor of the axiology / value theory part, without [so much] sounding as if a minimalist axiology would necessarily need to be combined with a strongly consequentialist view at the normative level.)
One of the issue I had with the term minimalist is that it has another meaning. But as you said “the descriptor ‘minimalist’ can refer to minimalism regarding how many fundamental assumptions a theory requires”, so basically the other meaning actually applies.
I should add that we ultimately decided to reduce the emphasis on value commensurability in this book, because the value commensurability argument for minimalist views was not so centrally relevant here, wasn’t laid out in sufficient detail yet, and might work better as its own separate argument at some point. But the book still refers to it in a few places.
I’m not exactly sure what you mean in this paragraph.
And I agree that the word ‘minimizing’ might be easily associated with typical consequentialism thinking so it might indeed not be the best.
I think both terms have their advantages. The same question has actually come up before. Here is what I replied the first time it came up:
For me, this aspect of value commensurability and theoretical parsimony is a major reason to favor purely minimalist axiologies over ‘negative-leaning’ ones. So the descriptor ‘minimalist’ can refer to minimalism regarding how many fundamental assumptions a theory requires.
I should add that we ultimately decided to reduce the emphasis on value commensurability in this book, because the value commensurability argument for minimalist views was not so centrally relevant here, wasn’t laid out in sufficient detail yet, and might work better as its own separate argument at some point. But the book still refers to it in a few places.
Additionally, we reduced the emphasis on monism because many of the book’s main points apply just as well to pluralist minimalist views which assume multiple intrinsic disvalues. Relatedly, I think the descriptor ‘minimizing’ sounds good and makes sense for consequentialist minimalist views in particular, but I imagine it might also sound too married to the kind of optimizing or systematizing mindset that may be typical of consequentialist thinking, at least to some people who might instead favor views like minimalist virtue ethics or minimalist care ethics without making consequentialism the centrally relevant component of their ethical views. (Thus, I suppose that ‘minimalist’ is a more neutral descriptor of the axiology / value theory part, without [so much] sounding as if a minimalist axiology would necessarily need to be combined with a strongly consequentialist view at the normative level.)
Thanks for the reply.
One of the issue I had with the term minimalist is that it has another meaning. But as you said “the descriptor ‘minimalist’ can refer to minimalism regarding how many fundamental assumptions a theory requires”, so basically the other meaning actually applies.
I’m not exactly sure what you mean in this paragraph.
And I agree that the word ‘minimizing’ might be easily associated with typical consequentialism thinking so it might indeed not be the best.