So, to simplify your problem: I help someone, but somewhere else there is someone else who I wasn’t able to help. Wat do?
You’re in this precise situation regardless of quantum physics; I guarantee you won’t be able to save everyone in your personal future light cone either. So I think that should simplify your question a bunch.
Why would this change your metaethical position? The reason you’d want to help someone else shouldn’t change if I make you aware of some additional people somewhere which you’re not capable of helping.
The reason you’d want to help someone else shouldn’t change if I make you aware of some additional people somewhere which you’re not capable of helping.
Interestingly, Eliezer claims here that that is precisely what caused the change in his case:
If my memory serves me, I converted to average utilitarianism as a direct result of believing in a Big World.
That’s from more than ten years ago. I’m unaware if that is still his position.
So, to simplify your problem: I help someone, but somewhere else there is someone else who I wasn’t able to help. Wat do?
You’re in this precise situation regardless of quantum physics; I guarantee you won’t be able to save everyone in your personal future light cone either. So I think that should simplify your question a bunch.
Why would this change your metaethical position? The reason you’d want to help someone else shouldn’t change if I make you aware of some additional people somewhere which you’re not capable of helping.
Interestingly, Eliezer claims here that that is precisely what caused the change in his case:
That’s from more than ten years ago. I’m unaware if that is still his position.