There was a lot in here that felt insightful and well considered.
I agree that thinking about the end state and humanity in the limit is a fruitful area of philosophy with potentially quite important implications. I wrestle with this sort of thing a lot.
One perspective I would note here (I associate this line of thinking with Will McAskill) is that we ought to be immediately aiming for a wiser, more stable sort of middle-ground and then aim for the āend stateā from there. I think that can make sense for a lot of practical reasons. I think there is enough of a complex truth to what is and isnāt morally good that I am inclined to believe the āmoral error as an x-riskā framing and, as such, I tend to place a high premium on option value. I think, given the practical uncertainties of the situation, I feel pretty comfortable aiming for /ā punting to some more general āāprocess of wise deliberationā over directly locking my current best guess into the cosmos.
That said, yāknow, we make decisions every day and it is still definitely worth tracking what my current best guess is for what ought actually be done with the physical matter and energy extant in the cosmos. I am partial to much of the substance that you put forward here.
āensuring the ongoing existence of sentienceā
āsentienceā is a bit tricky for me to parse, but I will put in for positively valenced subjective experience :)
āgaining total knowledge except that knowledge which requires inducing sufferingā
I mean, sure, why not? I think that sort of thing is cool and inspiring for the most part. There are probably things that would count as āknowledgeā to me, but which are so trivial that I wouldnāt necessarily care about them much. But, yāknow, I will put in for the practical necessity of learning more about the universe as well as the aesthetic/ā profound beauty of discovery the rules of the universe and the nature of nature.
āending all sufferingā
Fuck ya dude! Iām against evil and suffering seems like a central example of that. There may even be more aesthetic or injustice like things that I would consider evil even in the absence of negatively valenced experience per se which I might also entertain abolishing.
There is a lot to be said about the āend stateā which you donāt really mention here. Like, for example, I think it is good for people to be really, exceptionally happy if we can swing it. I donāt know how to think about population ethics honestly.
One issue that really bites for me when I try to picture the end of the struggle and the steady end state is:
people often intrinsically value reproducing
I want immortality
Each person may require a minimum subsistence amount of stuff to live happily (even if we shrink everyone or make provably morally relevant simulations or something)
Finite materials /ā scarcity
I have no reasonable way out of this conundrum and I hate biting the āpopulation controlā bullet. That reeks of, like, āone child policyā and overpopulation motivated genocides (cf. The Legacy of Indiaās Quest to Sterilize Millions of Men /ā Uttawar forced sterilizations). I think concerns in this general vein about the resources people use and the limits to growth are also pretty closely ties to the not uncommon concerns people have around over population /ā climate heads not wanting to have kids.
Also, to make it less abstract, I will admit that my morals /ā impulses are fundamentally quite natalist and I would quite like to be a Dad some day. Even if we grant that resource growth exceeds population growth for now, it seems hard to escape the Malthusian trap forever and I think this is a very fundamental tension in the limit.
Thanks very much for taking the time to respond, Jacob!
I think, given the practical uncertainties of the situation, I feel pretty comfortable aiming for /ā punting to some more general āāprocess of wise deliberationā over directly locking my current best guess into the cosmos.
A useful analogy may be how people think they want their life to look like when theyāre old. The reality of how oneās life will actually look may be uncertain, itās possible that one will figure out some stuff that may change how one wants their life to be in old age, and there is nothing wrong with taking a process of wise deliberation along the way in oneās life. Nonetheless, having an aim that one has reasoned through can help one in that process of wise deliberation on the way to old age.
āsentienceā is a bit tricky for me to parse, but I will put in for positively valenced subjective experience :)
I wouldnāt necessarily say it need be positively valenced, but rather at least not negatively valenced. Neutral may suffice.
There are probably things that would count as āknowledgeā to me, but which are so trivial that I wouldnāt necessarily care about them much. But, yāknow, I will put in for the practical necessity of learning more about the universe as well as the aesthetic/ā profound beauty of discovery the rules of the universe and the nature of nature.
Perhaps every little trivial thing wouldnāt be necessary to know. But when thinking in terms of something with unimaginable cognitive capacity and limitless time, even trivial things might be worth knowing.
There is a lot to be said about the āend stateā which you donāt really mention here. Like, for example, I think it is good for people to be really, exceptionally happy if we can swing it. I donāt know how to think about population ethics honestly.
Sure! Iām happy to talk address that. I assume at that time there need not be life as we know it. Iām not necessarily opposed to it in addition to what Iāve laid out, but I donāt think itās particularly important when weāre thinking about time spans of googols of years.
people often intrinsically value reproducing
Just like humans are the byproduct of an evolutionary process, so is the human and animal desire to reproduce. This is also something Iām not necessarily opposed to but also donāt think is particularly important to maintain in the timescales weāre talking about. For instance, we are already seeing wealthy human societies experience sub-replacement fertility. Perhaps once all of humanity is wealthy in a few centuries or millennia, the whole world will experience sub-replacement fertility? I canāt say, but I view these as relatively short-term concerns.
I have no reasonable way out of this conundrum and I hate biting the āpopulation controlā bullet. ā¦ I think concerns in this general vein about the resources people use and the limits to growth are also pretty closely ties to the not uncommon concerns people have around over population /ā climate heads not wanting to have kids. ā¦ Also, to make it less abstract, I will admit that my morals /ā impulses are fundamentally quite natalist and I would quite like to be a Dad some day. Even if we grant that resource growth exceeds population growth for now, it seems hard to escape the Malthusian trap forever and I think this is a very fundamental tension in the limit.
I tend to not be too concerned about the issues raised by anti-natalists regarding overpopulation and climate and tend to be pretty bullish on resource and technological growth exceeding population growth for the foreseeable future. Iāve counseled friends of mine who are concerned about climate change they shouldnāt be afraid to have kids on that basis, for example. However, I tend to prioritize a different set of concerns when thinking about issues decades or centuries into the future versus periods of googols of years into the future. When thinking about those kinds of timespans, the concerns we prioritize on a day-to-day basis or century-to-century basis look small in comparison.
Again, thank you very much for the feedback Jacob. Much appreciated!
There was a lot in here that felt insightful and well considered.
I agree that thinking about the end state and humanity in the limit is a fruitful area of philosophy with potentially quite important implications. I wrestle with this sort of thing a lot.
One perspective I would note here (I associate this line of thinking with Will McAskill) is that we ought to be immediately aiming for a wiser, more stable sort of middle-ground and then aim for the āend stateā from there. I think that can make sense for a lot of practical reasons. I think there is enough of a complex truth to what is and isnāt morally good that I am inclined to believe the āmoral error as an x-riskā framing and, as such, I tend to place a high premium on option value. I think, given the practical uncertainties of the situation, I feel pretty comfortable aiming for /ā punting to some more general āāprocess of wise deliberationā over directly locking my current best guess into the cosmos.
That said, yāknow, we make decisions every day and it is still definitely worth tracking what my current best guess is for what ought actually be done with the physical matter and energy extant in the cosmos. I am partial to much of the substance that you put forward here.
āensuring the ongoing existence of sentienceā
āsentienceā is a bit tricky for me to parse, but I will put in for positively valenced subjective experience :)
āgaining total knowledge except that knowledge which requires inducing sufferingā
I mean, sure, why not? I think that sort of thing is cool and inspiring for the most part. There are probably things that would count as āknowledgeā to me, but which are so trivial that I wouldnāt necessarily care about them much. But, yāknow, I will put in for the practical necessity of learning more about the universe as well as the aesthetic/ā profound beauty of discovery the rules of the universe and the nature of nature.
āending all sufferingā
Fuck ya dude! Iām against evil and suffering seems like a central example of that. There may even be more aesthetic or injustice like things that I would consider evil even in the absence of negatively valenced experience per se which I might also entertain abolishing.
There is a lot to be said about the āend stateā which you donāt really mention here. Like, for example, I think it is good for people to be really, exceptionally happy if we can swing it. I donāt know how to think about population ethics honestly.
One issue that really bites for me when I try to picture the end of the struggle and the steady end state is:
people often intrinsically value reproducing
I want immortality
Each person may require a minimum subsistence amount of stuff to live happily (even if we shrink everyone or make provably morally relevant simulations or something)
Finite materials /ā scarcity
I have no reasonable way out of this conundrum and I hate biting the āpopulation controlā bullet. That reeks of, like, āone child policyā and overpopulation motivated genocides (cf. The Legacy of Indiaās Quest to Sterilize Millions of Men /ā Uttawar forced sterilizations). I think concerns in this general vein about the resources people use and the limits to growth are also pretty closely ties to the not uncommon concerns people have around over population /ā climate heads not wanting to have kids.
Also, to make it less abstract, I will admit that my morals /ā impulses are fundamentally quite natalist and I would quite like to be a Dad some day. Even if we grant that resource growth exceeds population growth for now, it seems hard to escape the Malthusian trap forever and I think this is a very fundamental tension in the limit.
Thanks very much for taking the time to respond, Jacob!
A useful analogy may be how people think they want their life to look like when theyāre old. The reality of how oneās life will actually look may be uncertain, itās possible that one will figure out some stuff that may change how one wants their life to be in old age, and there is nothing wrong with taking a process of wise deliberation along the way in oneās life. Nonetheless, having an aim that one has reasoned through can help one in that process of wise deliberation on the way to old age.
I wouldnāt necessarily say it need be positively valenced, but rather at least not negatively valenced. Neutral may suffice.
Perhaps every little trivial thing wouldnāt be necessary to know. But when thinking in terms of something with unimaginable cognitive capacity and limitless time, even trivial things might be worth knowing.
Sure! Iām happy to talk address that. I assume at that time there need not be life as we know it. Iām not necessarily opposed to it in addition to what Iāve laid out, but I donāt think itās particularly important when weāre thinking about time spans of googols of years.
Just like humans are the byproduct of an evolutionary process, so is the human and animal desire to reproduce. This is also something Iām not necessarily opposed to but also donāt think is particularly important to maintain in the timescales weāre talking about. For instance, we are already seeing wealthy human societies experience sub-replacement fertility. Perhaps once all of humanity is wealthy in a few centuries or millennia, the whole world will experience sub-replacement fertility? I canāt say, but I view these as relatively short-term concerns.
I tend to not be too concerned about the issues raised by anti-natalists regarding overpopulation and climate and tend to be pretty bullish on resource and technological growth exceeding population growth for the foreseeable future. Iāve counseled friends of mine who are concerned about climate change they shouldnāt be afraid to have kids on that basis, for example. However, I tend to prioritize a different set of concerns when thinking about issues decades or centuries into the future versus periods of googols of years into the future. When thinking about those kinds of timespans, the concerns we prioritize on a day-to-day basis or century-to-century basis look small in comparison.
Again, thank you very much for the feedback Jacob. Much appreciated!