It sounds like proper steelmanning is mostly applied to arguments, evidence, values, and reasons, whereas mithrilmanning is often applied more to specific influential individuals who tend to be associated with certain positions. (e.g. we might think ’Yann LeCun’s machine learning research has been cited 600,000 times, so he must have some valid points when he expresses the view that we shouldn’t worry about AI extinction risk—even though he sounds irrational and deranged on this topic.) The mithril armor is really being wrapped around some prestigious person who’s making apparently weak arguments, more than around the apparently weak arguments themselves.
My suggestion for overcoming mithrilmanning is to find a less prestigious, but still reputable person, who makes the same arguments, and interrogate the validity of those arguments as if they’re from a less influential source. (e.g. if some less-famous AI researchers makes basically the same arguments as LeCun, then dissect that less-famous person’s arguments, rather than trying to face down LeCun, as if he’s some Final Boss in a scary video game.) This is basically a social psychology hack to make us less intimidated by some famous person’s reputation, so we can engage with the quality of their arguments, without getting misled by our instincts to submit and defer to high-status individuals.
Yes, reflecting on this since posting, I have been wondering if there is some important distinction between the principle of charity applied to arguments in the abstract vs its application to the (understated) reasoning of individuals in some particular instance. Steelmanning seems good in the former case, because you’re aiming to work your way to the truth. But steelmanning goes to far, and become mithrilmanning, in the latter case when you start assuming the individuals must have good reasons, even though you don’t know what they are.
Perhaps mithrilmanning involves an implicit argument from authority (“this person is an authority. Therefore they must be right. Why might they be right?”).
Michael—good points.
It sounds like proper steelmanning is mostly applied to arguments, evidence, values, and reasons, whereas mithrilmanning is often applied more to specific influential individuals who tend to be associated with certain positions. (e.g. we might think ’Yann LeCun’s machine learning research has been cited 600,000 times, so he must have some valid points when he expresses the view that we shouldn’t worry about AI extinction risk—even though he sounds irrational and deranged on this topic.) The mithril armor is really being wrapped around some prestigious person who’s making apparently weak arguments, more than around the apparently weak arguments themselves.
My suggestion for overcoming mithrilmanning is to find a less prestigious, but still reputable person, who makes the same arguments, and interrogate the validity of those arguments as if they’re from a less influential source. (e.g. if some less-famous AI researchers makes basically the same arguments as LeCun, then dissect that less-famous person’s arguments, rather than trying to face down LeCun, as if he’s some Final Boss in a scary video game.) This is basically a social psychology hack to make us less intimidated by some famous person’s reputation, so we can engage with the quality of their arguments, without getting misled by our instincts to submit and defer to high-status individuals.
Yes, reflecting on this since posting, I have been wondering if there is some important distinction between the principle of charity applied to arguments in the abstract vs its application to the (understated) reasoning of individuals in some particular instance. Steelmanning seems good in the former case, because you’re aiming to work your way to the truth. But steelmanning goes to far, and become mithrilmanning, in the latter case when you start assuming the individuals must have good reasons, even though you don’t know what they are.
Perhaps mithrilmanning involves an implicit argument from authority (“this person is an authority. Therefore they must be right. Why might they be right?”).