To me, any moral theory that dictates that innocent children should die is probably breaking apart at that point. Instead he bites the bullet and assumes that the means (preventing suffering) justifies the ends (letting innocent children die). I am sorry to say that I find that morally repugnant. [...] Instead, I have a strong sense that innocent children should not be let die. If my moral theory disagrees with the strong ethical sense, it is the strong ethical sense that should guide the moral theory, and not the other way around.
Hmm, but we are all letting children die all the time from not donating. I am donating just 15% of my income; I could certainly donate 20-30% and save additional lives that way. I think my failing to donate 20-30% is morally imperfect, but I wouldnât call it repugnant. What is it that makes âI wonât donate to save lives because I think it creates a lot of animal sufferingâ repugnant but âI wonât donate to save lives because I prefer to have more income for myselfâ not?
What is it that makes âI wonât donate to save lives because I think it creates a lot of animal sufferingâ repugnant but âI wonât donate to save lives because I prefer to have more income for myselfâ not?
I think actively advocating for others to not save childrenâs lives is a step beyond a mere decision not to donate. I read it this way:
Action: Write EA Forum post criticizing lifesaving as net-negative activity.
Implied Theory of Impact: Readers decide not to donate to GiveWell et al. --> Fewer lives get saved --> Less meat gets eaten --> Fewer animals suffer.
If Iâm reading the theory of impact correctly, innocent children dying is a key part of the intended mechanism of action (MoA) -- not a side effect (as it is with âprefer to have more income for myselfâ).
There are obviously some cruxes hereâincluding whether there is a moral difference between actively advocating for others not to hand out bednets vs. passively choosing to donate elsewhere /â spend on oneself, and whether there is a moral difference between a bad thing being part of the intended MoA vs. a side effect. I would answer yes to both, but I have lower consequentialist representation in my moral parliament than many people here.
Even if one would answer no to both cruxes, I submit that âno endorsing MoAs that involve the death of innocent peopleâ is an important set of side rails for the EA movement. I think advocacy that saving the lives of children is net-negative is outside of those rails. For those who might not agree, Iâm curious where they would put the rails (or whether they disagree with the idea that there should be rails).
Thanks, that is a useful distinction. Although I would guess Vasco would prefer to frame the theory of impact as âfind out whether donating to GiveWell is net positive â help people make donation choices that promote welfare betterâ or something like that. I buy @Richard Y Chappellđ¸âs take that it is really bad to discourage others from effective giving (at least when itâs done carelessly/ânegligently), but imo Vasco was not setting out to discourage effective giving, or it doesnât seem like that to me. He isâIâm guessingâcooperatively seeking to help effective givers and others make choices that better promote welfare, which they are presumably interested in doing.
There are obviously some cruxes hereâincluding whether there is a moral difference between actively advocating for others not to hand out bednets vs. passively choosing to donate elsewhere /â spend on oneself, and whether there is a moral difference between a bad thing being part of the intended MoA vs. a side effect. I would answer yes to both, but I have lower consequentialist representation in my moral parliament than many people here.
Yes, I personally lean towards thinking the act-omission difference doesnât matter (except maybe as a useful heuristic sometimes).
As for whether the harm to humans is incidental-but-necessary or part-of-the-mechanism-and-necessary, Iâm not sure what difference it makes if the outcomes are identical? Maybe the difference is that, when the harm to humans is part-of-the-mechanism-and-necessary, you may suspect that itâs indicative of a bad moral attitude. But I think the attitude behind âI wonât donate to save lives because I think it creates a lot of animal sufferingâ is clearly better (since it is concerned with promoting welfare) than the attitude behind âI wonât donate to save lives because I prefer to have more income for myselfâ (which is not).
Even if one would answer no to both cruxes, I submit that âno endorsing MoAs that involve the death of innocent peopleâ is an important set of side rails for the EA movement. I think advocacy that saving the lives of children is net-negative is outside of those rails. For those who might not agree, Iâm curious where they would put the rails (or whether they disagree with the idea that there should be rails).
I do not think it is good to create taboos around this question. Like, does that mean we shouldnât post anything that can be construed as concluding that itâs net harmful to donate to GiveWell charities? If so, that would make it much harder to criticise GiveWell and find out what the truth is. What if donating to GiveWell charities really is harmful? Shouldnât we want to know and find out?
I do not think it is good to create taboos around this question. Like, does that mean we shouldnât post anything that can be construed as concluding that itâs net harmful to donate to GiveWell charities? If so, that would make it much harder to criticise GiveWell and find out what the truth is. What if donating to GiveWell charities really is harmful? Shouldnât we want to know and find out?
The taboo would be around advocacy of the view that âit is better for the world for innocent group X of people not to exist.â Here, innocent group X would be under-5s in developing countries who are/âwould be saved by GiveWell interventions. That certain criticisms of GiveWell couldnât be made without breaking the taboo would be a collateral effect rather than the intent, but itâs very hard to avoid over-inclusiveness in a taboo.
There have been social movements that assert that âit is better for the world for innocent group X of people not to existâ and encourage people to make legal, non-violent decisions premised on that belief. But I think the base rate of those social movements going well is low (and it may be ~zero). Based on that history and experience, I would need to see a very compelling argument to convince me that going down that path was a good idea here. I donât see that here; in particular, I think advocacy of the reader donating a share of their charitable budget to animal-welfare orgs to offset any potential negative AW effects of the lifesaving work they fund is considerably less problematic.
Relatedly, I also donât see things going well for EA if it is seen as acceptable for each of us to post our list of group X and encourage others to not pull members of group X out of a drowning pond even if we could do so costlessly or nearly so. Out of respect for Forum norms, Iâm not going to speculate on who other readersâ Group Xs might include, but I can think of several off the top of my head for whom one could make a plausible net-negative argument, all of whom would be less morally objectionable to include on the list than toddlers....
To clarify, I think Iâm ok with having a taboo on advocacy against âit is better for the world for innocent group X of people not to existâ, since that seems like the kind of naive utilitarianism we should definitely avoid. Iâm just against a taboo on asking or trying to better understand whether âit is better for the world for innocent group X of people not to existâ is true or not. I donât think Vasco was engaging in advocacy, my impression was that he was trying to do the latter, while expressing a lot of uncertainty.
Hmm, but we are all letting children die all the time from not donating. I am donating just 15% of my income; I could certainly donate 20-30% and save additional lives that way. I think my failing to donate 20-30% is morally imperfect, but I wouldnât call it repugnant. What is it that makes âI wonât donate to save lives because I think it creates a lot of animal sufferingâ repugnant but âI wonât donate to save lives because I prefer to have more income for myselfâ not?
I think actively advocating for others to not save childrenâs lives is a step beyond a mere decision not to donate. I read it this way:
Action: Write EA Forum post criticizing lifesaving as net-negative activity.
Implied Theory of Impact: Readers decide not to donate to GiveWell et al. --> Fewer lives get saved --> Less meat gets eaten --> Fewer animals suffer.
If Iâm reading the theory of impact correctly, innocent children dying is a key part of the intended mechanism of action (MoA) -- not a side effect (as it is with âprefer to have more income for myselfâ).
There are obviously some cruxes hereâincluding whether there is a moral difference between actively advocating for others not to hand out bednets vs. passively choosing to donate elsewhere /â spend on oneself, and whether there is a moral difference between a bad thing being part of the intended MoA vs. a side effect. I would answer yes to both, but I have lower consequentialist representation in my moral parliament than many people here.
Even if one would answer no to both cruxes, I submit that âno endorsing MoAs that involve the death of innocent peopleâ is an important set of side rails for the EA movement. I think advocacy that saving the lives of children is net-negative is outside of those rails. For those who might not agree, Iâm curious where they would put the rails (or whether they disagree with the idea that there should be rails).
Thanks, that is a useful distinction. Although I would guess Vasco would prefer to frame the theory of impact as âfind out whether donating to GiveWell is net positive â help people make donation choices that promote welfare betterâ or something like that. I buy @Richard Y Chappellđ¸âs take that it is really bad to discourage others from effective giving (at least when itâs done carelessly/ânegligently), but imo Vasco was not setting out to discourage effective giving, or it doesnât seem like that to me. He isâIâm guessingâcooperatively seeking to help effective givers and others make choices that better promote welfare, which they are presumably interested in doing.
Yes, I personally lean towards thinking the act-omission difference doesnât matter (except maybe as a useful heuristic sometimes).
As for whether the harm to humans is incidental-but-necessary or part-of-the-mechanism-and-necessary, Iâm not sure what difference it makes if the outcomes are identical? Maybe the difference is that, when the harm to humans is part-of-the-mechanism-and-necessary, you may suspect that itâs indicative of a bad moral attitude. But I think the attitude behind âI wonât donate to save lives because I think it creates a lot of animal sufferingâ is clearly better (since it is concerned with promoting welfare) than the attitude behind âI wonât donate to save lives because I prefer to have more income for myselfâ (which is not).
I do not think it is good to create taboos around this question. Like, does that mean we shouldnât post anything that can be construed as concluding that itâs net harmful to donate to GiveWell charities? If so, that would make it much harder to criticise GiveWell and find out what the truth is. What if donating to GiveWell charities really is harmful? Shouldnât we want to know and find out?
The taboo would be around advocacy of the view that âit is better for the world for innocent group X of people not to exist.â Here, innocent group X would be under-5s in developing countries who are/âwould be saved by GiveWell interventions. That certain criticisms of GiveWell couldnât be made without breaking the taboo would be a collateral effect rather than the intent, but itâs very hard to avoid over-inclusiveness in a taboo.
There have been social movements that assert that âit is better for the world for innocent group X of people not to existâ and encourage people to make legal, non-violent decisions premised on that belief. But I think the base rate of those social movements going well is low (and it may be ~zero). Based on that history and experience, I would need to see a very compelling argument to convince me that going down that path was a good idea here. I donât see that here; in particular, I think advocacy of the reader donating a share of their charitable budget to animal-welfare orgs to offset any potential negative AW effects of the lifesaving work they fund is considerably less problematic.
Relatedly, I also donât see things going well for EA if it is seen as acceptable for each of us to post our list of group X and encourage others to not pull members of group X out of a drowning pond even if we could do so costlessly or nearly so. Out of respect for Forum norms, Iâm not going to speculate on who other readersâ Group Xs might include, but I can think of several off the top of my head for whom one could make a plausible net-negative argument, all of whom would be less morally objectionable to include on the list than toddlers....
To clarify, I think Iâm ok with having a taboo on advocacy against âit is better for the world for innocent group X of people not to existâ, since that seems like the kind of naive utilitarianism we should definitely avoid. Iâm just against a taboo on asking or trying to better understand whether âit is better for the world for innocent group X of people not to existâ is true or not. I donât think Vasco was engaging in advocacy, my impression was that he was trying to do the latter, while expressing a lot of uncertainty.