On Carlsmith’s example, we can just make it a logical necessity by assuming more. And, as you acknowledge the possibility, some distinctions can be too fine. Maybe you’re only 5% sure your copy exists at all and the conditions are right for you to get $1 million from your copy sending it.
5%*$1 million = $50,000 > $1,000, so you still make more in expectation from sending a million dollars. You break even in expected money if your decision to send $1 million increases your copy’s probability of sending $1 million by 1⁄1,000.
I do find it confusing to think about decision-making under determinism, but I think 3 proves too much. I don’t think quantum indeterminacy or randomness saves free will or agency if it weren’t already saved, and we don’t seem to have any other options, assuming physicalism and our current understanding of physics.
On Carlsmith’s example, we can just make it a logical necessity by assuming more. And, as you acknowledge the possibility, some distinctions can be too fine. Maybe you’re only 5% sure your copy exists at all and the conditions are right for you to get $1 million from your copy sending it.
5%*$1 million = $50,000 > $1,000, so you still make more in expectation from sending a million dollars. You break even in expected money if your decision to send $1 million increases your copy’s probability of sending $1 million by 1⁄1,000.
I do find it confusing to think about decision-making under determinism, but I think 3 proves too much. I don’t think quantum indeterminacy or randomness saves free will or agency if it weren’t already saved, and we don’t seem to have any other options, assuming physicalism and our current understanding of physics.