Thanks so much for your thoughtful and detailed comment, Mitchell! It seems like we’re roughly on the same page regarding the various constraints that a successful theory of consciousness should meet, as well as the class of approaches that seem most promising. Let me just share some immediate reactions I had while reading your comment. :)
The problem with entanglement is that it potentially gives you too much unity
Potentially, yes (though my understanding of entanglement is limited). On the other hand, as Atai has pointed out, “most binding-appreciators strongly, strongly underestimate just how ‘insane’ it is that we can have any candidate solution to the binding problem *at all* [entanglement] in a universe that remotely resembles the universe described by classical physics.” (Here’s his full writeup, which I find very compelling.) This makes me think that maybe we will find that entanglement gives us just the right amount of unity (though the specific mechanism might turn out to be pretty elaborate). Do you have any resources on the point about “too much unity”? I’d love to learn more.
First of all, the nature of the structures that hypothetically bridge fundamental physics and conscious states is still wide open, because the mathematics of fundamental physics is still wide open.
Agree, and this is part of what motivates the argument outlined in the last paragraph of the section “Sufficiently detailed replicas/simulations” above.
For me, the core arguments against substrate-indifferent information-based theory of consciousness, revolve around vagueness.
But there are a number of challenges to this argument—aren’t states of mind vague too?
Maybe, yeah, depending on how we define a state of mind. But as you pointed out, “there is a kind of ontological exactness that states of consciousness must possess,” which I also agree with—namely, that at least some moments of experience seem to exhibit some amount of fundamentally integrated information / binding. So if an ontology can’t accommodate that, it’s doomed. I believe that’s the case for information-based theories, since any unity is interpreted by us arbitrarily, i.e. it’s epiphenomenal.
They only require that your simulation is a little more fine-grained than we used to believe necessary.
I think “a little more” is doing a lot of work here. If consciousness is a thing/substrate, then any emulation that abstracts away finer levels of granularity will, by definition, not be that substrate, and therefore not be conscious (unless maybe one commits to the claim that the deepest layer of reality is binary/bits, as pointed out above).
In any case, at least for quantum theories of mind to become widely convincing, there needs to be some evidence that quantum biology is playing a role in conscious cognition, evidence which I believe is still quite lacking. Hameroff’s microtubules are still by far the best candidate I have, for a biological locus of persistent coherent quantum states, but it seems difficult to get decisive evidence of coherence. The length of the debate about whether quantum coherence occurs in photosynthesis shows how difficult it can be.
I confess I still don’t fully understand why we need to definitively prove that coherence has to be sustained. QM plays a causal role in the brain because it plays a causal role in everything, as I was hoping to convey with my xenon example. But I’ll keep thinking!
I’ll add another candidate for quantum biology into the mix: the Posner molecule (also mentioned by Atai here).
Thanks so much for your thoughtful and detailed comment, Mitchell! It seems like we’re roughly on the same page regarding the various constraints that a successful theory of consciousness should meet, as well as the class of approaches that seem most promising. Let me just share some immediate reactions I had while reading your comment. :)
Potentially, yes (though my understanding of entanglement is limited). On the other hand, as Atai has pointed out, “most binding-appreciators strongly, strongly underestimate just how ‘insane’ it is that we can have any candidate solution to the binding problem *at all* [entanglement] in a universe that remotely resembles the universe described by classical physics.” (Here’s his full writeup, which I find very compelling.) This makes me think that maybe we will find that entanglement gives us just the right amount of unity (though the specific mechanism might turn out to be pretty elaborate). Do you have any resources on the point about “too much unity”? I’d love to learn more.
Agree, and this is part of what motivates the argument outlined in the last paragraph of the section “Sufficiently detailed replicas/simulations” above.
Same for me. The paper “Are algorithms always arbitrary?” makes this case nicely.
Maybe, yeah, depending on how we define a state of mind. But as you pointed out, “there is a kind of ontological exactness that states of consciousness must possess,” which I also agree with—namely, that at least some moments of experience seem to exhibit some amount of fundamentally integrated information / binding. So if an ontology can’t accommodate that, it’s doomed. I believe that’s the case for information-based theories, since any unity is interpreted by us arbitrarily, i.e. it’s epiphenomenal.
I think “a little more” is doing a lot of work here. If consciousness is a thing/substrate, then any emulation that abstracts away finer levels of granularity will, by definition, not be that substrate, and therefore not be conscious (unless maybe one commits to the claim that the deepest layer of reality is binary/bits, as pointed out above).
I confess I still don’t fully understand why we need to definitively prove that coherence has to be sustained. QM plays a causal role in the brain because it plays a causal role in everything, as I was hoping to convey with my xenon example. But I’ll keep thinking!
I’ll add another candidate for quantum biology into the mix: the Posner molecule (also mentioned by Atai here).
Thanks again! :)