Executive summary: In a personal reflection inspired by recent critiques, the author argues that the widely held belief in “functionally equivalent artificial neurons”—central to digital consciousness discussions—is untenable, because real neurons’ complexity and substrate-specific phenomena (like electromagnetic and quantum effects) cannot be abstracted away without losing essential causal properties critical to consciousness.
Key points:
The “cartoon neuron” model oversimplifies real neurons, ignoring complex intra-cellular processes like dendritic computation, ephaptic coupling, and potential quantum effects that likely play a causal role in brain function.
Arguments for abstracting away complexity (e.g., universal function approximation) are inadequate, because critical aspects like the speed and nature of information processing depend on the brain’s physical substrate and cannot simply be mimicked by slower, simplified systems.
Simulating the brain in sufficient detail would be computationally infeasible, as capturing all relevant physical interactions—some propagating at light speed—would require more time than the age of the universe for even simple systems.
Common defenses of substrate independence (like “deep reality is binary”) are speculative and question-begging, with some physical theories (e.g., string theory) suggesting the foundational substrate may be topological, not binary.
Rejecting substrate independence challenges the credibility of digital consciousness claims, including those about LLMs, brain emulations, and collective entities like nations.
The author tentatively endorses a non-materialist physicalist view, proposing that fields of qualia might form the fundamental basis of consciousness, better addressing existing theoretical challenges.
This comment was auto-generated by the EA Forum Team. Feel free to point out issues with this summary by replying to the comment, and contact us if you have feedback.
Executive summary: In a personal reflection inspired by recent critiques, the author argues that the widely held belief in “functionally equivalent artificial neurons”—central to digital consciousness discussions—is untenable, because real neurons’ complexity and substrate-specific phenomena (like electromagnetic and quantum effects) cannot be abstracted away without losing essential causal properties critical to consciousness.
Key points:
The “cartoon neuron” model oversimplifies real neurons, ignoring complex intra-cellular processes like dendritic computation, ephaptic coupling, and potential quantum effects that likely play a causal role in brain function.
Arguments for abstracting away complexity (e.g., universal function approximation) are inadequate, because critical aspects like the speed and nature of information processing depend on the brain’s physical substrate and cannot simply be mimicked by slower, simplified systems.
Simulating the brain in sufficient detail would be computationally infeasible, as capturing all relevant physical interactions—some propagating at light speed—would require more time than the age of the universe for even simple systems.
Common defenses of substrate independence (like “deep reality is binary”) are speculative and question-begging, with some physical theories (e.g., string theory) suggesting the foundational substrate may be topological, not binary.
Rejecting substrate independence challenges the credibility of digital consciousness claims, including those about LLMs, brain emulations, and collective entities like nations.
The author tentatively endorses a non-materialist physicalist view, proposing that fields of qualia might form the fundamental basis of consciousness, better addressing existing theoretical challenges.
This comment was auto-generated by the EA Forum Team. Feel free to point out issues with this summary by replying to the comment, and contact us if you have feedback.