Hi Michael, I appreciate the kind effortpost, as per usual. I’ll do my best to answer.
This is a very important question. To restate it in several ways: what kind of thing is suffering? What kind of question is ‘what is suffering’? What would a philosophically satisfying definition of suffering look like? How would we know if we saw it? Why does QRI think existing theories of suffering are lacking? Is an answer to this question a matter of defining some essence, or defining causal conditions, or something else?
Our intent is to define phenomenological valence in a fully formal way, with the template being physics: we wish to develop our models such that we can speak of pain and pleasure with all the clarity, precision, and rigor as we currently describe photons and quarks and fields.
This may sound odd, but physics is a grand success story of formalization, and we essentially wish to apply the things that worked in physics, to phenomenology. Importantly, physics has a strong tradition of using symmetry considerations to inform theory. STV borrows squarely from this tradition (see e.g. my write up on Emmy Noether).
Valence is subjective as you note, but that doesn’t mean it’s arbitrary; there are deep patterns in which conditions and sensations feel good, and which feel bad. We think it’s possible to create a formal system for the subjective. Valence and STV are essentially the pilot project for this system. Others such as James and Husserl have tried to make phenomenological systems, but we believe they didn’t have all the pieces of the puzzle. I’d offer our lineages page for what we identify as ‘the pieces of the puzzle’; these are the shoulders we’re standing on to build our framework.
2. I see the question. Also, thank you for your work on the Happier Lives Institute; we may not interact frequently but I really like what you’re doing.
The significance of a fully rigorous theory of valence might not be fully apparent, even to the people working on it. Faraday and Maxwell formalized electromagnetism; they likely did not foresee theIr theory being used to build the iPhone. However, I suspect that they had deep intuitions that there’s something deeply useful in understanding the structure of nature, and perhaps they wouldn’t be as surprised as their contemporaries. We also hold intuitions as to the applications of a full theory of valence.
The simplest would be, it would unlock novel psychological and psychiatric diagnostics. If there is some difficult-to-diagnose nerve pain, or long covid type bodily suffering, or some emotional disturbance that is difficult to verbalize, well, this is directly measurable in principle with STV. This wouldn’t replace economics and psychology, as you say, but it would augment them.
Longer term, I’m reminded of the (adapted) phrase, “what you can measure, you can manage.” If you can reliably measure suffering, you can better design novel interventions for reducing it. I could see a validated STV as the heart of a revolution in psychiatry, and some of our work (Neural Annealing, Wireheading Done Right) are aimed at possible shapes this might take.
3. Aha, an easy question :) I’d point you toward our web glossary.
To your question, “Finally, and perhaps most importantly, I really not sure what it could even mean to represent consciousness/ valence as a mathematic shape“ — this is perhaps an overly-fancy way of saying that we believe consciousness is precisely formalizable. The speed of light is precisely formalizable; the UK tax rate is precisely formalizable; the waveform of an mp3 is precisely formalizable, and all of these formalizations can be said to be different ‘mathematical shapes’. To say something does not have a ‘mathematical shape’ is to say it defies formal analysis.
Thanks again for your clear and helpful questions.
Hi Michael, I appreciate the kind effortpost, as per usual. I’ll do my best to answer.
This is a very important question. To restate it in several ways: what kind of thing is suffering? What kind of question is ‘what is suffering’? What would a philosophically satisfying definition of suffering look like? How would we know if we saw it? Why does QRI think existing theories of suffering are lacking? Is an answer to this question a matter of defining some essence, or defining causal conditions, or something else?
Our intent is to define phenomenological valence in a fully formal way, with the template being physics: we wish to develop our models such that we can speak of pain and pleasure with all the clarity, precision, and rigor as we currently describe photons and quarks and fields.
This may sound odd, but physics is a grand success story of formalization, and we essentially wish to apply the things that worked in physics, to phenomenology. Importantly, physics has a strong tradition of using symmetry considerations to inform theory. STV borrows squarely from this tradition (see e.g. my write up on Emmy Noether).
Valence is subjective as you note, but that doesn’t mean it’s arbitrary; there are deep patterns in which conditions and sensations feel good, and which feel bad. We think it’s possible to create a formal system for the subjective. Valence and STV are essentially the pilot project for this system. Others such as James and Husserl have tried to make phenomenological systems, but we believe they didn’t have all the pieces of the puzzle. I’d offer our lineages page for what we identify as ‘the pieces of the puzzle’; these are the shoulders we’re standing on to build our framework.
2. I see the question. Also, thank you for your work on the Happier Lives Institute; we may not interact frequently but I really like what you’re doing.
The significance of a fully rigorous theory of valence might not be fully apparent, even to the people working on it. Faraday and Maxwell formalized electromagnetism; they likely did not foresee theIr theory being used to build the iPhone. However, I suspect that they had deep intuitions that there’s something deeply useful in understanding the structure of nature, and perhaps they wouldn’t be as surprised as their contemporaries. We also hold intuitions as to the applications of a full theory of valence.
The simplest would be, it would unlock novel psychological and psychiatric diagnostics. If there is some difficult-to-diagnose nerve pain, or long covid type bodily suffering, or some emotional disturbance that is difficult to verbalize, well, this is directly measurable in principle with STV. This wouldn’t replace economics and psychology, as you say, but it would augment them.
Longer term, I’m reminded of the (adapted) phrase, “what you can measure, you can manage.” If you can reliably measure suffering, you can better design novel interventions for reducing it. I could see a validated STV as the heart of a revolution in psychiatry, and some of our work (Neural Annealing, Wireheading Done Right) are aimed at possible shapes this might take.
3. Aha, an easy question :) I’d point you toward our web glossary.
To your question, “Finally, and perhaps most importantly, I really not sure what it could even mean to represent consciousness/ valence as a mathematic shape“ — this is perhaps an overly-fancy way of saying that we believe consciousness is precisely formalizable. The speed of light is precisely formalizable; the UK tax rate is precisely formalizable; the waveform of an mp3 is precisely formalizable, and all of these formalizations can be said to be different ‘mathematical shapes’. To say something does not have a ‘mathematical shape’ is to say it defies formal analysis.
Thanks again for your clear and helpful questions.