Are there any misconceptions, stereotypes, or tropes that you commonly see in academic literature around nuclear security or biosecurity that you could correct given your perspective inside government?
There are several common misconceptions about biological weapons that contribute to underestimating the threat they pose. These include seeing them as strategically irrational, not tactically useful, and too risky for countries to pursue.
In reality, biological weapons have served strategic goals for countries in the past like deterrence and intimidation. Their use could also provide tactical advantages in conflicts.
Countries have historically taken on substantial risks in pursuing risky weapons programs when they believe the strategic benefits outweigh the costs. Accidents and blowback would not necessarily deter programs.
Decisions around biological weapons activities are not always top-down and known to all national leaders. Bureaucratic and individual interests can influence programs apart from formal policy.
International norms and laws alone are insufficient to deter or discover clandestine biological weapons work given lack of verification. COVID has shown existing vulnerabilities.
Dispelling these misconceptions is important for strengthening defenses against the real biological weapons threat, which pandemic has shown remains serious despite decades of effort. More investment is needed.
Are there any misconceptions, stereotypes, or tropes that you commonly see in academic literature around nuclear security or biosecurity that you could correct given your perspective inside government?
Some of our amazing former Council on Strategic Risks Ending Bioweapons Fellows wrote this outstanding paper debunking common misconceptions about biological weapons: https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Common-Misconceptions-About-Biological-Weapons_BRIEFER-12_2020_12_7.pdf
Here’s a summary of the report from Claude-1 if someone’s looking for an ‘abstract’: