My understanding is that your proposed policy would be something like ārepresent an interval of credences and only take āactionsā if the action seems net good across your interval of credencesā. ā¦ youād take no actions and do the default. (Starving to death? Itās unclear what the default should be which makes this heuristic more confusing to apply.)
Definitely not saying this! I donāt think that (w.r.t. consequentialism at least) thereās any privileged distinction between āactionsā and āinactionā, nor do I think Iāve ever implied this. My claim is: For any A and B, if itās not the case that EV_p(A) > EV_p(B) for all p in the representor P,[1] and vice versa, then both A and B are permissible. This means that you have no reason to choose A over B or vice versa (again, w.r.t. consequentialism). Inaction isnāt privileged, but neither is any particular action.
Now of course one needs to pick some act (āactionā or otherwise) all things considered, but I explain my position on that here.
properly incorporating model uncertainty into your estimates
What do you mean by āproperly incorporatingā? I think any answer here that doesnāt admit indeterminacy/āimprecision will be arbitrary, as argued in my unawareness sequence.
basically any interval which is supposed to include the plausible ranges of belief goes ~all the way from 0 to 1
Why do you think this? I argue here and here (see Q4 and links therein) why that need not be the case, especially when weāre forming beliefs relevant to local-scale goals.
My understanding is that you work around this by saying āwe ignore considerations which are further down the crazy train (e.g. simulations, long run future, etc) or otherwise seem more āspeculativeā until weāre able to take literally any actions at all and then proceed at that stop on the trainā.
Also definitely not saying this. (I explicitly push back on such ad hoc ignoring of crazy-train considerations here.) My position is: (1) W.r.t. impartial consequentialism we canāt ignore any considerations. (2) But insofar as weāre making decisions based on ~immediate self-interest, parochial concern for others near to us, and non-consequentialist reasons, crazy-train considerations arenāt normatively relevant ā so itās not ad hoc to ignore them in that case. See also this great comment by Max Daniel. (Regardless, none of this is a positive argument for āmake up precise credences about crazy-train considerations and act on themā.)
Definitely not saying this! I donāt think that (w.r.t. consequentialism at least) thereās any privileged distinction between āactionsā and āinactionā, nor do I think Iāve ever implied this. My claim is: For any A and B, if itās not the case that EV_p(A) > EV_p(B) for all p in the representor P,[1] and vice versa, then both A and B are permissible. This means that you have no reason to choose A over B or vice versa (again, w.r.t. consequentialism). Inaction isnāt privileged, but neither is any particular action.
Now of course one needs to pick some act (āactionā or otherwise) all things considered, but I explain my position on that here.
What do you mean by āproperly incorporatingā? I think any answer here that doesnāt admit indeterminacy/āimprecision will be arbitrary, as argued in my unawareness sequence.
Why do you think this? I argue here and here (see Q4 and links therein) why that need not be the case, especially when weāre forming beliefs relevant to local-scale goals.
Also definitely not saying this. (I explicitly push back on such ad hoc ignoring of crazy-train considerations here.) My position is: (1) W.r.t. impartial consequentialism we canāt ignore any considerations. (2) But insofar as weāre making decisions based on ~immediate self-interest, parochial concern for others near to us, and non-consequentialist reasons, crazy-train considerations arenāt normatively relevant ā so itās not ad hoc to ignore them in that case. See also this great comment by Max Daniel. (Regardless, none of this is a positive argument for āmake up precise credences about crazy-train considerations and act on themā.)
Technically this should be weakened to āweak inequality for all p + strict inequality for at least one pā.