Hi, I think I share these intuitions (surveillance is bad) but have a few qualms about your arguments:
Regarding multi-layered defence, I agree it seems best to not solely rely on one protective mechanism. I am unconvinced that having super surveillance will significantly lower other defence mechanisms. (I don’t think people wearing seat belts drive more recklessly?). Also, if we grant that people will be lulled into false sense of security, then I could well imagine malicious actors would likewise assume surveillance is very effective, and think ‘oh well, I won’t try to end the world as I’d just get caught.’ Alternately, if surveillance is more a bluff than something that actually works great, it may still impose significant costs on malicious actors, eg not being able to recruit or communicate over long distances, coordination problems, and generally just slow them down because they are spending resources trying not to be surveilled.
Regarding Hanna’s comment, as you note with CCTV, I think humans are just remarkably adaptable, and while there may be some transition pains, I think growing up in a fully-surveilled society wouldn’t seem that bad or strange. I think because people get used to things, we would also keep being weird and thinking well, as long as the surveillance was indeed very focused on preventing mega-bad things.
I also share Jack’s worry that these somewhat fuzzier concerns about people thinking less independently and being anxious and boring and mainstream do rather pale in comparison to reducing catastrophic risks, at least if one places some credence on more totalising versions of longtermism. Thus, for me I think the key reasons I’m not super bullish on surveillance are that it would be really hard to implement well and globally, as you note, and I agree the totalitarianism risk seems major and plausibly outweighs the gains.
On 1: I agree it’s not clear that having surveillance would make us less likely to implement other defence mechanisms because of a false sense of security. I think it’s more plausible that having surveillance makes us less likely to implement other defence mechanisms because implementing new policies takes time, political energy, and money. I think it makes sense to think about policymaking as a prioritisation question, and probably controversial and expensive policies are less likely to be implemented if the issue they address is perceived to have been dealt with. So I’d expect implementing perceived effective surveillance to decrease the likelihood that other defence mechanisms aimed at reducing GCRs are implemented. (Although this isn’t necessarily the case—maybe increasing surveillance makes other extreme defence mechanisms less politically costly?) This is isn’t an argument I make in my post, so thanks for pushing back!
I like your point on supposedly effective surveillance as a kind of bluff. I think this imposes a lower bound on the effectiveness of global surveillance, as even ineffective surveillance will have this deterrence effect. However, I’d guess that over time, malicious actors will realise that the system is less effective than they initially thought, and so the risk from malicious actors creeps back up again. (This is speculative: I’m guessing that some actors will still try things and realise that they don’t get caught, and that there’s some communication between malicious actors. My immediate reaction was “man, it’d be hard for a surveillance system that wasn’t that effective to be considered effective for a really long time, won’t people find out?”)
On 2 and 3: yeah, I agree with you here that totalitarianism risk is the main problem, and I should have been clearer about that in my post. I can imagine (like you say) that in a world where trusted global surveillance has always been the norm, we remain weird and free-thinking.
Hi, I think I share these intuitions (surveillance is bad) but have a few qualms about your arguments:
Regarding multi-layered defence, I agree it seems best to not solely rely on one protective mechanism. I am unconvinced that having super surveillance will significantly lower other defence mechanisms. (I don’t think people wearing seat belts drive more recklessly?). Also, if we grant that people will be lulled into false sense of security, then I could well imagine malicious actors would likewise assume surveillance is very effective, and think ‘oh well, I won’t try to end the world as I’d just get caught.’ Alternately, if surveillance is more a bluff than something that actually works great, it may still impose significant costs on malicious actors, eg not being able to recruit or communicate over long distances, coordination problems, and generally just slow them down because they are spending resources trying not to be surveilled.
Regarding Hanna’s comment, as you note with CCTV, I think humans are just remarkably adaptable, and while there may be some transition pains, I think growing up in a fully-surveilled society wouldn’t seem that bad or strange. I think because people get used to things, we would also keep being weird and thinking well, as long as the surveillance was indeed very focused on preventing mega-bad things.
I also share Jack’s worry that these somewhat fuzzier concerns about people thinking less independently and being anxious and boring and mainstream do rather pale in comparison to reducing catastrophic risks, at least if one places some credence on more totalising versions of longtermism. Thus, for me I think the key reasons I’m not super bullish on surveillance are that it would be really hard to implement well and globally, as you note, and I agree the totalitarianism risk seems major and plausibly outweighs the gains.
On 1: I agree it’s not clear that having surveillance would make us less likely to implement other defence mechanisms because of a false sense of security. I think it’s more plausible that having surveillance makes us less likely to implement other defence mechanisms because implementing new policies takes time, political energy, and money. I think it makes sense to think about policymaking as a prioritisation question, and probably controversial and expensive policies are less likely to be implemented if the issue they address is perceived to have been dealt with. So I’d expect implementing perceived effective surveillance to decrease the likelihood that other defence mechanisms aimed at reducing GCRs are implemented. (Although this isn’t necessarily the case—maybe increasing surveillance makes other extreme defence mechanisms less politically costly?) This is isn’t an argument I make in my post, so thanks for pushing back!
I like your point on supposedly effective surveillance as a kind of bluff. I think this imposes a lower bound on the effectiveness of global surveillance, as even ineffective surveillance will have this deterrence effect. However, I’d guess that over time, malicious actors will realise that the system is less effective than they initially thought, and so the risk from malicious actors creeps back up again. (This is speculative: I’m guessing that some actors will still try things and realise that they don’t get caught, and that there’s some communication between malicious actors. My immediate reaction was “man, it’d be hard for a surveillance system that wasn’t that effective to be considered effective for a really long time, won’t people find out?”)
On 2 and 3: yeah, I agree with you here that totalitarianism risk is the main problem, and I should have been clearer about that in my post. I can imagine (like you say) that in a world where trusted global surveillance has always been the norm, we remain weird and free-thinking.