Yes, I have updated towards the view that a single funder can strongly influence the direction and focus of a research field.
I notice I feel reluctant to give any detailed description of what I learned in those conversations in this entirely public forum; I’d like people to feel as if they can share their opinions with me without those later being broadcast.
My broad, stitched-together impression (which could be as much my interpretation as the opinion of those I spoke to) is that people are excited about the emergence of a major new funder, but leery of the sudden change in what research is most easily able to get funded. In addition to bringing new people into the field, Open Phil granting has redirected some established researchers to focus on GCBRs, and I think there is a view that GCBRs are a valid concern, but not so singularly important that they should overwhelm other research agendas.
What are some reasons people think GCBRs deserve less attention (relative to how Open Phil prioritizes this work)?
I’d be interest to learn more about reasons beyond “a diversity of perspectives and research focuses is good for the field”, or background on why diversifying outside of GCR might be really important for biosecurity in particular. (E.g., “demanding that biosecurity researchers demonstrate relevance to GCBR is likely to stunt more basic or early-stage research that’s also critical for GCBR, but at a greater temporal and causal remove”; or “GCBR is a bad way of thinking about the relationship between GCR and biosecurity, because the main GCR risks in this context are second-order effects from smaller-scale biosecurity incidents rather than e.g. global pandemics”.)
The main object-level argument in Lenzos’ article seems to be that GCBR is “extremely unlikely”:
Biosecurity covers a spectrum of risks, ranging from naturally occurring disease, through unintended consequences of research, lab accidents, negligence, and reckless behavior, to deliberate misuse of pathogens or technology by state and non-state actors. The scenarios all have different likelihoods of playing out—and risks with potential catastrophic consequences on a global scale are among the least likely. But Open Phil dollars are flooding into biosecurity and are absorbing much of the field’s experienced research capacity, focusing the attention of experts on this narrow, extremely unlikely, aspect of biosecurity risk.
If this argument can be made in a compelling way from a perspective that’s longtermist and focused on EV, I’d be really interested to learn more about it.
Yes, I have updated towards the view that a single funder can strongly influence the direction and focus of a research field.
I notice I feel reluctant to give any detailed description of what I learned in those conversations in this entirely public forum; I’d like people to feel as if they can share their opinions with me without those later being broadcast.
My broad, stitched-together impression (which could be as much my interpretation as the opinion of those I spoke to) is that people are excited about the emergence of a major new funder, but leery of the sudden change in what research is most easily able to get funded. In addition to bringing new people into the field, Open Phil granting has redirected some established researchers to focus on GCBRs, and I think there is a view that GCBRs are a valid concern, but not so singularly important that they should overwhelm other research agendas.
What are some reasons people think GCBRs deserve less attention (relative to how Open Phil prioritizes this work)?
I’d be interest to learn more about reasons beyond “a diversity of perspectives and research focuses is good for the field”, or background on why diversifying outside of GCR might be really important for biosecurity in particular. (E.g., “demanding that biosecurity researchers demonstrate relevance to GCBR is likely to stunt more basic or early-stage research that’s also critical for GCBR, but at a greater temporal and causal remove”; or “GCBR is a bad way of thinking about the relationship between GCR and biosecurity, because the main GCR risks in this context are second-order effects from smaller-scale biosecurity incidents rather than e.g. global pandemics”.)
The main object-level argument in Lenzos’ article seems to be that GCBR is “extremely unlikely”:
If this argument can be made in a compelling way from a perspective that’s longtermist and focused on EV, I’d be really interested to learn more about it.
Lentzos has written about elsewhere about why she thinks terrorists using synthetic bioweapons is so unlikely. I quickly summarised in this comment: https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/Kkw8uDwGuNnBhiYHi/will-splashy-philanthropy-cause-the-biosecurity-field-to#QupzPSJLmjoF2A4pN