Thomas (2019) calls these sorts of person-affecting views “wide”. I think “narrow” person-affecting views can be more liberal (due to incommensurability) about what kinds of beings are brought about.
And narrow asymmetric person-affecting views, as in Thomas, 2019 and Pummer, 2024, can still tell you to prevent “bad” lives or bads in lives, but, contrary to antinatalist views, “good” lives and goods in lives can still offset the bad. Pummer (2024) solves a special case of the Nonidentity problem this way, by looking at goods and bads in lives.
But these asymmetric views may be less liberal than strict/symmetric narrow person-affecting views, because they could be inclined to prevent the sorts of lives of which many are bad in favour of better average lives. Or more liberal, depending on how you think of liberalism. If someone would have a horrible life to which they would object, it seems illiberal to force them to have it.
I think these papers have made some pretty important progress in further developing person-affecting views.[1]
I think they need to be better adapted to choices between more than 2 options, in order to avoid the Repugnant Conclusion and replacement (St. Jules, 2024). I’ve been working on this and have a tentative solution, but I’m struggling to find anyone interested in reading my draft.
(Edited to elaborate and for clarity.)
Thomas (2019) calls these sorts of person-affecting views “wide”. I think “narrow” person-affecting views can be more liberal (due to incommensurability) about what kinds of beings are brought about.
And narrow asymmetric person-affecting views, as in Thomas, 2019 and Pummer, 2024, can still tell you to prevent “bad” lives or bads in lives, but, contrary to antinatalist views, “good” lives and goods in lives can still offset the bad. Pummer (2024) solves a special case of the Nonidentity problem this way, by looking at goods and bads in lives.
But these asymmetric views may be less liberal than strict/symmetric narrow person-affecting views, because they could be inclined to prevent the sorts of lives of which many are bad in favour of better average lives. Or more liberal, depending on how you think of liberalism. If someone would have a horrible life to which they would object, it seems illiberal to force them to have it.
I think these papers have made some pretty important progress in further developing person-affecting views.[1]
I think they need to be better adapted to choices between more than 2 options, in order to avoid the Repugnant Conclusion and replacement (St. Jules, 2024). I’ve been working on this and have a tentative solution, but I’m struggling to find anyone interested in reading my draft.