On cluelessness: if you have complex cluelessness as deep uncertainty about your expected value conditional on the possibility of acausal influence, then it seems likely you should still have complex cluelessness as deep uncertainty all-things-considered, because deep uncertainty will be infectious, at least if its range is higher (or incomparable) than that assuming acausal influence is impossible.
For example, suppose
10% to acausal influence, and expected value of some action conditional on it of −5*10^50 to 10^51, a range due to deep uncertainty.
90% to no acausal influence, and expected value of 10^20 conditional on it.
Then the unconditional expected effects are still roughly −5*10^49 to 10^50, assuming the obvious intertheoretic comparisons between causal and acausal decision theories from MacAskill et al., 2021, and so deeply uncertain. If you don’t make intertheoretic comparisons, then you could still be deeply uncertain, but it could depend on how exactly you treat normative uncertainty.
If you instead use precise probabilities even with acausal influence and the obvious intertheoretic comparisons, then it would be epistemically suspicious if the expected value conditional on acausal influence were ~0 and didn’t dominate the expected value without acausal influence. One little piece of evidence biasing you one way or another gets multiplied across the (possibly infinite) multiverse under acausal influence.[1]
Maybe the expected value is also infinite without acausal influence, too, but a reasonable approach to infinite aggregation would probably find acausal influence to dominate, anyway.
On cluelessness: if you have complex cluelessness as deep uncertainty about your expected value conditional on the possibility of acausal influence, then it seems likely you should still have complex cluelessness as deep uncertainty all-things-considered, because deep uncertainty will be infectious, at least if its range is higher (or incomparable) than that assuming acausal influence is impossible.
For example, suppose
10% to acausal influence, and expected value of some action conditional on it of −5*10^50 to 10^51, a range due to deep uncertainty.
90% to no acausal influence, and expected value of 10^20 conditional on it.
Then the unconditional expected effects are still roughly −5*10^49 to 10^50, assuming the obvious intertheoretic comparisons between causal and acausal decision theories from MacAskill et al., 2021, and so deeply uncertain. If you don’t make intertheoretic comparisons, then you could still be deeply uncertain, but it could depend on how exactly you treat normative uncertainty.
If you instead use precise probabilities even with acausal influence and the obvious intertheoretic comparisons, then it would be epistemically suspicious if the expected value conditional on acausal influence were ~0 and didn’t dominate the expected value without acausal influence. One little piece of evidence biasing you one way or another gets multiplied across the (possibly infinite) multiverse under acausal influence.[1]
Maybe the expected value is also infinite without acausal influence, too, but a reasonable approach to infinite aggregation would probably find acausal influence to dominate, anyway.