on a psychological level, we think of morality in terms of ‘is this person moral’, not ‘is this act moral’. We are trying to figure out if the person in front of us is trustworthy, loyal, kind, etc.
I think this, as written, is not explanatory, because one could regard another to be of immoral character on the basis that they perform immoral acts. I’m not sure what else ‘moral character’ could mean, other than “their inner character would endorse acting in {moral or immoral way}”.
I think it would be correct to say that average humans act on various non-moral judgements in ways we think should be reserved for moral judgements.
In the study, participants [...] view a person who hits a cat as more immoral than a person who hits their spouse
Hmm, I might share this view (I’m unsure which evidences the more bad character), but I don’t think it comes from something irrational. It’s more like: inferring underlying principles they might have in some deep, unconscious level. E.g., someone who hits a cat might have a deep attitude of finding it okay to hurt the weak. But someone hitting a spouse is also evidence of different bad ‘deep attitudes’. This way of thinking about the question is compatible with my consequentialism, because how those individuals act is a result of these ‘deep attitudes’.
If I understand you correctly I think we broadly agree that people tend to use how someone acts to judge moral character. I think though this point is underappreciated in EA, as evidenced by the existence of this forum post. The question is ‘why do people get so much more upset about hitting one horse than the horrors of factory farming’, when clearly in terms of the badness of an act, factory farming is much worse. The point is that when people view a moral/immoral act, psychologically they are evaluating the moral character of the person, not the act in and of itself.
My point was that purchasing animal products usually suggests a bad ‘moral character’ trait: the willingness to cause immense individual harm when this is normative/convenient.
I’m saying that average people’s judgements of others’ characters are not best described as ‘moral’ per se, because if they were, they would judge each other harshly for consuming animals.
So this involves a bit of potentially tenuous evolutionary psychology, but I think part of what is going on here is that people are judging moral character based on what would have made sense to judge people on 10,000 years ago which is, is this person loyal to their friends (ie me), empathetic, helps the person in front of them without question, etc.
I think it’s important to distinguish between morality (what is right and wrong) from moral psychology (how do people think about what is right and wrong). On this account, buying animal products tells you that a person is a normal member of society, and hitting an animal tells you someone is cruel, not to be trusted, potentially psychopathic, etc.
Okay, sounds like we indeed agree on the object-level. I guess it’s just not intuitive to me to refer to things like ‘will this person be loyal to me’ as ‘moral character’
I think this, as written, is not explanatory, because one could regard another to be of immoral character on the basis that they perform immoral acts. I’m not sure what else ‘moral character’ could mean, other than “their inner character would endorse acting in {moral or immoral way}”.
I think it would be correct to say that average humans act on various non-moral judgements in ways we think should be reserved for moral judgements.
Hmm, I might share this view (I’m unsure which evidences the more bad character), but I don’t think it comes from something irrational. It’s more like: inferring underlying principles they might have in some deep, unconscious level. E.g., someone who hits a cat might have a deep attitude of finding it okay to hurt the weak. But someone hitting a spouse is also evidence of different bad ‘deep attitudes’. This way of thinking about the question is compatible with my consequentialism, because how those individuals act is a result of these ‘deep attitudes’.
Hi Quila,
If I understand you correctly I think we broadly agree that people tend to use how someone acts to judge moral character. I think though this point is underappreciated in EA, as evidenced by the existence of this forum post. The question is ‘why do people get so much more upset about hitting one horse than the horrors of factory farming’, when clearly in terms of the badness of an act, factory farming is much worse. The point is that when people view a moral/immoral act, psychologically they are evaluating the moral character of the person, not the act in and of itself.
My point was that purchasing animal products usually suggests a bad ‘moral character’ trait: the willingness to cause immense individual harm when this is normative/convenient.
I’m saying that average people’s judgements of others’ characters are not best described as ‘moral’ per se, because if they were, they would judge each other harshly for consuming animals.
So this involves a bit of potentially tenuous evolutionary psychology, but I think part of what is going on here is that people are judging moral character based on what would have made sense to judge people on 10,000 years ago which is, is this person loyal to their friends (ie me), empathetic, helps the person in front of them without question, etc.
I think it’s important to distinguish between morality (what is right and wrong) from moral psychology (how do people think about what is right and wrong). On this account, buying animal products tells you that a person is a normal member of society, and hitting an animal tells you someone is cruel, not to be trusted, potentially psychopathic, etc.
Okay, sounds like we indeed agree on the object-level. I guess it’s just not intuitive to me to refer to things like ‘will this person be loyal to me’ as ‘moral character’