Hi Sarah! I broadly agree with the post, but I do think there’s a marginal value argument against becoming a doctor that doesn’t apply to working at EA orgs. Namely:
Suppose I’m roughly as good at being a doctor as the next-doctor-up. My choosing to become a doctor brings about situation A over situation B:
Situation A: I’m a doctor, next-doctor-up goes to their backup plan Situation B: next-doctor-up is a doctor, I go to my backup plan
Since we’re equally good doctors, the only difference is in whose backup plan is better—so I should prefer situation B, in which I don’t become a doctor, as long as I think my backup plan will do more good than their backup plan. This seems likely to be the case for anyone strongly motivated to do good, including EAs.
To make a similar case against working at an EA org, you would have to believe that your backup plan is significantly better than other EAs’ backup plans.
EDIT: I should say I agree it’s possible that friction in applying for EA jobs could outweigh any chance you have of being better than the next candidate. Just saying I think the argument against becoming a doctor is different—and stronger, because there are bigger gains on the table.
That’s a good point, and I’m inclined to agree, at least on an abstract level. My question then becomes how you evaluate what the backup plans of others are. Is this something based on data? Rough estimations? It seems like it could work on a very roughly approximated level, but I would imagine there would be a lot of uncertainty and variation.
Hi Sarah! I broadly agree with the post, but I do think there’s a marginal value argument against becoming a doctor that doesn’t apply to working at EA orgs. Namely:
Suppose I’m roughly as good at being a doctor as the next-doctor-up. My choosing to become a doctor brings about situation A over situation B:
Situation A: I’m a doctor, next-doctor-up goes to their backup plan
Situation B: next-doctor-up is a doctor, I go to my backup plan
Since we’re equally good doctors, the only difference is in whose backup plan is better—so I should prefer situation B, in which I don’t become a doctor, as long as I think my backup plan will do more good than their backup plan. This seems likely to be the case for anyone strongly motivated to do good, including EAs.
To make a similar case against working at an EA org, you would have to believe that your backup plan is significantly better than other EAs’ backup plans.
EDIT: I should say I agree it’s possible that friction in applying for EA jobs could outweigh any chance you have of being better than the next candidate. Just saying I think the argument against becoming a doctor is different—and stronger, because there are bigger gains on the table.
That’s a good point, and I’m inclined to agree, at least on an abstract level. My question then becomes how you evaluate what the backup plans of others are. Is this something based on data? Rough estimations? It seems like it could work on a very roughly approximated level, but I would imagine there would be a lot of uncertainty and variation.