This is because plausible person-affecting views will still find it important to improve the lives of future people who will necessarily exist.
I agree with this. But the challenge from the Non-Identity problem is that there are few, if any, necessarily existing future individuals: what we do causes different people to come into existence. This raises a challenge to longtermism: how can we make the future go better if we can’t make it go better for anyone in particular? If an outcome is not better for anyone, how can it be better? In the discourse, philosophers tend to accept that it is the implication of (some) person-affecting views that we can’t (really) make the future go better for anyone, but take this implication as a decisive reason to reject those views. My suspicion is that philosophers have been too quick to dismiss such person-affecting views and they merit another look.
Hmm. Do you seriously think that philosophers have been too quick to dismiss such person-affecting views?
If you accept that impacts on the future generally don’t matter because you won’t really be harming anyone, as they wouldn’t have existed if you hadn’t done the act, then you can justify doing some things that I’d imagine pretty much everyone would agree is wrong.
For example, you could justify going around putting millions of landmines underground set to blow up in 200 years time causing immense misery to future people for no other reason than you want to cause their suffering. Provided those people will still live net positive lives overall, your logic says this isn’t a bad thing to do. Do you really think it’s OK to place the mines? Do you think anyone bar a psychopath thinks it’s OK to place the mines?
Of course, as you imply, there are other ways to respond to the non-identity problem. You could resort to an impersonal utilitarianism where you say no, don’t place the mines because it will cause immense suffering and suffering is intrinsically bad. Do you really think this is a weaker response?
Hello Jack (again!),
I agree with this. But the challenge from the Non-Identity problem is that there are few, if any, necessarily existing future individuals: what we do causes different people to come into existence. This raises a challenge to longtermism: how can we make the future go better if we can’t make it go better for anyone in particular? If an outcome is not better for anyone, how can it be better? In the discourse, philosophers tend to accept that it is the implication of (some) person-affecting views that we can’t (really) make the future go better for anyone, but take this implication as a decisive reason to reject those views. My suspicion is that philosophers have been too quick to dismiss such person-affecting views and they merit another look.
Hmm. Do you seriously think that philosophers have been too quick to dismiss such person-affecting views?
If you accept that impacts on the future generally don’t matter because you won’t really be harming anyone, as they wouldn’t have existed if you hadn’t done the act, then you can justify doing some things that I’d imagine pretty much everyone would agree is wrong.
For example, you could justify going around putting millions of landmines underground set to blow up in 200 years time causing immense misery to future people for no other reason than you want to cause their suffering. Provided those people will still live net positive lives overall, your logic says this isn’t a bad thing to do. Do you really think it’s OK to place the mines? Do you think anyone bar a psychopath thinks it’s OK to place the mines?
Of course, as you imply, there are other ways to respond to the non-identity problem. You could resort to an impersonal utilitarianism where you say no, don’t place the mines because it will cause immense suffering and suffering is intrinsically bad. Do you really think this is a weaker response?