Let me see if I can build on this reasoning. Please tell me if Iāve misunderstood your position.
Since weāre pretty sure there will indeed be people living in Bangladesh in the future, youāre saying itās reasonable to take into account the future lives saved by the seawalls when comparing the choice of whether to invest in climate resiliency vs immediately spend on bednets.
But, your position implies, we can only consider the lives saved by the seawalls, not future children who would be had by the people saved by seawalls, right? Suppose we have considered every possible way to save lives, and narrowed it down to two options: give bednets to elderly folks in areas with endemic malaria, or invest in seawalls in Bangladesh. Saving the elderly from malaria is the most cost-effective present-day intervention youāve found, and it would have a benefit of X. Alternatively, weāve done some demographic studies of Bangladesh, and some detailed climate forecasting, and concluded that the seawalls would directly save some people who havenāt been born yet but will be, and would be killed by extreme weather, for a benefit of Y. Suppose further that we know those people will go on to have children, and the population will be counterfactually higher by an additional amount, for an additional benefit Z.
Youāre saying that the correct comparison is not X vs 0 (which would be correct if you ignore all benefits to hypothetical future people), nor X vs Y+Z (which is if you include all benefits to hypothetical future people), but X vs Y (which is the appropriate comparison if you do include benefits to future people, but not ones who are brought about by your choosing between the options).
Yes, thatās right. (edit: thinking in terms of lives saved from populations here, not benefits accruing to those populatiions) X vs Y. If Y is chosen (ie, if the lives of Y are saved), and the seawall is built, then Y+Z (those populations) have moral status for me, assuming I am certain that (population) Y will conceive population Z. The details are below, but thatās my summary answer for you.
EDIT: Sorry, in the discussion below, my use of language confuses the original posterās meaning of X as a benefit with the population rX receiving benefit X. Hopefully you can understand what I wrote. I address the spirit of the question, namely, is a choice between populations, one of which leads to additional contingent population, bound by my belief that only people who will exist have moral status. As a further summary, and maybe to untangle benefits from populations at some point, I believe in:
mathematical comparison: comparing benefits for size and multiplying population by benefit per capita (if meaningful)
actual peopleās moral status: giving only actual (not potential) people moral status
smallness: of future populations having benefits, all other things equal.
inclusive solutions: whenever feasible (for example, saving all at-risk populations)
And now, continuing on with my original discussion...
...
So, to use your example, I have to believe a few things:
bednets extend lives of people who wonāt have children.
seawalls extend lives of people who will have children.
a life extended is an altruistic benefit to the person who lives longer.
a life created is an altruistic benefit to the person created.
I will try to steelman where this argument goes with a caveat:
as part of beliefs 3 and 4, an extended or created life does not reduce quality of life for any other human. NOTE: in a climate change context 20-30 years from now, I donāt actually believe 3, 4, or this caveat will hold for the majority of the human global population.
I think your question is:
how I decide the benefit in terms of lives extended or created? For me, that is roughly the same as asking what consequences the actions of installing seawalls and providing bednets each have. In the case where each action is an exclusive alternative and my action to take, I might for altruistic reasons choose the action with greater altruistic consequences.
So, your scenario goes:
X = total years of lives saved by bednets.
Y= total years of lives saved by seawalls.
Z = total years of lives lived for children born behind seawalls if seawalls are built.
EDIT: below I will refer to X, Y, and Z as populations, not the benefits accrued by the populations, since my discussion makes no mention of differences in benefits, just differences in populations and counts of lives saved.
Lets assume further that:
in your scenario X and Y are based on the same number of people.
lives in population X and population Y are extended by the same amount of time.
people in populations X and Y each value their lives equally.
people in population X and Y experience the same amount of happiness.
My answer comes down to whether I believe that it is my choice whether to cause (savings of lives of) X or Y+Z. If it is my choice, then I would choose X over Y+Z out of personal preference and beliefs, because:
Z is a hypothetical population, while X and Y are not. Choosing against Z only means that Z are never conceived.
The numbers of people and the years given to them are the same for Y as they are for X. My impact on each population if I save them is the same.
Humans have less impact on the natural world and its creatures with a smaller population, and a future of X is smaller than a future of Y+Z.
A smaller population of humans causes less difficulty for those seeking altruistic ends for existing lives, for example, in case I want to be altruistic after saving one of the populations.
Aside from this scenario, however, what I calculate as altruistically beneficial is that X+Y are saved and children Z are never conceived because family planning and common-sense allows population Y to not have children Z. Returning to this scenario, though, I can only save one of X or Y and if I save Y, they will have children Z. Then, for the reasons I listed, I would choose X over Y.
I just went through your scenario in a context where I choose whether to save population X or population Y, but not both. Now I will go through the same scenario, but in a context where I do not choose between population X or population Y.
If:
it is not my choice whether X or Y+Z is chosen.
other existing people chose to save population Y with a seawall.
If population Y has a seawall, they will have children Z.
population Y have or will get a seawall.
Then:
population Y will have children Z.
the population Z is no longer hypothetical.
Y+Z have moral status even though Z are not conceived yet.
However, there is no way of choosing between X and Y+Z that ignores that the future occurrence of Z is contingent on the choice and thus hypothetical. Accordingly, population Z has no moral status unless population Y is saved by seawalls.
Notice that, even then, I must believe that population Y will go on to have children Z. This is not a question of whether children Z could be conceived or if I suspect that population Y will have children Z or if I believe that it is Yās option to have children Z. I really have to know that Y will have children Z.
Also notice that, even if I remove beliefs 3 and 4, that does not mean that X or Y populations lose their moral status. A person stuck in suffering has moral status. However, decisions about how to help them will be different.
For example, if putting up seawalls saves Bangladesh from floods but not from drought and famine, I would say that their lives saved and their happiness while alive are in doubt. Similarly in the case of saving the elderly from malaria. If you save them from malaria but they now face worse conditions than suffering malaria, then your extending their lives or happiness while alive are in doubt. Well, in doubt from my perspective.
However, I see nothing wrong with adding to potential for a good life, all other things equal. Iād say that the āall other things equalā only applies when you know very little about the consequences of your actions and your choices are not driven by resource constraints that force difficult decisions.
If:
you are altruistically-minded
you have plenty of resources (for example, bednets and cement) so you donāt have to worry about triage
you donāt have beliefs about what else will happen when you save someoneās life
then it makes sense to help that person (or population). So yeah, supply the bednets and build the seawalls because why not? Who know who will have children or eat meat or cause others harm or suffer a worse disease or die from famine? Maybe everything turns out better, and even if it doesnāt, youāve done no harm by preventing a disease or stopping flooding from sea level rise.
Let me see if I can build on this reasoning. Please tell me if Iāve misunderstood your position.
Since weāre pretty sure there will indeed be people living in Bangladesh in the future, youāre saying itās reasonable to take into account the future lives saved by the seawalls when comparing the choice of whether to invest in climate resiliency vs immediately spend on bednets.
But, your position implies, we can only consider the lives saved by the seawalls, not future children who would be had by the people saved by seawalls, right? Suppose we have considered every possible way to save lives, and narrowed it down to two options: give bednets to elderly folks in areas with endemic malaria, or invest in seawalls in Bangladesh. Saving the elderly from malaria is the most cost-effective present-day intervention youāve found, and it would have a benefit of X. Alternatively, weāve done some demographic studies of Bangladesh, and some detailed climate forecasting, and concluded that the seawalls would directly save some people who havenāt been born yet but will be, and would be killed by extreme weather, for a benefit of Y. Suppose further that we know those people will go on to have children, and the population will be counterfactually higher by an additional amount, for an additional benefit Z.
Youāre saying that the correct comparison is not X vs 0 (which would be correct if you ignore all benefits to hypothetical future people), nor X vs Y+Z (which is if you include all benefits to hypothetical future people), but X vs Y (which is the appropriate comparison if you do include benefits to future people, but not ones who are brought about by your choosing between the options).
Is this indeed your position?
Yes, thatās right. (edit: thinking in terms of lives saved from populations here, not benefits accruing to those populatiions) X vs Y. If Y is chosen (ie, if the lives of Y are saved), and the seawall is built, then Y+Z (those populations) have moral status for me, assuming I am certain that (population) Y will conceive population Z. The details are below, but thatās my summary answer for you.
EDIT: Sorry, in the discussion below, my use of language confuses the original posterās meaning of X as a benefit with the population rX receiving benefit X. Hopefully you can understand what I wrote. I address the spirit of the question, namely, is a choice between populations, one of which leads to additional contingent population, bound by my belief that only people who will exist have moral status. As a further summary, and maybe to untangle benefits from populations at some point, I believe in:
mathematical comparison: comparing benefits for size and multiplying population by benefit per capita (if meaningful)
actual peopleās moral status: giving only actual (not potential) people moral status
smallness: of future populations having benefits, all other things equal.
inclusive solutions: whenever feasible (for example, saving all at-risk populations)
And now, continuing on with my original discussion...
...
So, to use your example, I have to believe a few things:
bednets extend lives of people who wonāt have children.
seawalls extend lives of people who will have children.
a life extended is an altruistic benefit to the person who lives longer.
a life created is an altruistic benefit to the person created.
I will try to steelman where this argument goes with a caveat:
as part of beliefs 3 and 4, an extended or created life does not reduce quality of life for any other human. NOTE: in a climate change context 20-30 years from now, I donāt actually believe 3, 4, or this caveat will hold for the majority of the human global population.
I think your question is:
how I decide the benefit in terms of lives extended or created?
For me, that is roughly the same as asking what consequences the actions of installing seawalls and providing bednets each have. In the case where each action is an exclusive alternative and my action to take, I might for altruistic reasons choose the action with greater altruistic consequences.
So, your scenario goes:
X = total years of lives saved by bednets.
Y= total years of lives saved by seawalls.
Z = total years of lives lived for children born behind seawalls if seawalls are built.
EDIT: below I will refer to X, Y, and Z as populations, not the benefits accrued by the populations, since my discussion makes no mention of differences in benefits, just differences in populations and counts of lives saved.
Lets assume further that:
in your scenario X and Y are based on the same number of people.
lives in population X and population Y are extended by the same amount of time.
people in populations X and Y each value their lives equally.
people in population X and Y experience the same amount of happiness.
My answer comes down to whether I believe that it is my choice whether to cause (savings of lives of) X or Y+Z. If it is my choice, then I would choose X over Y+Z out of personal preference and beliefs, because:
Z is a hypothetical population, while X and Y are not. Choosing against Z only means that Z are never conceived.
The numbers of people and the years given to them are the same for Y as they are for X. My impact on each population if I save them is the same.
Humans have less impact on the natural world and its creatures with a smaller population, and a future of X is smaller than a future of Y+Z.
A smaller population of humans causes less difficulty for those seeking altruistic ends for existing lives, for example, in case I want to be altruistic after saving one of the populations.
Aside from this scenario, however, what I calculate as altruistically beneficial is that X+Y are saved and children Z are never conceived because family planning and common-sense allows population Y to not have children Z. Returning to this scenario, though, I can only save one of X or Y and if I save Y, they will have children Z. Then, for the reasons I listed, I would choose X over Y.
I just went through your scenario in a context where I choose whether to save population X or population Y, but not both. Now I will go through the same scenario, but in a context where I do not choose between population X or population Y.
If:
it is not my choice whether X or Y+Z is chosen.
other existing people chose to save population Y with a seawall.
If population Y has a seawall, they will have children Z.
population Y have or will get a seawall.
Then:
population Y will have children Z.
the population Z is no longer hypothetical.
Y+Z have moral status even though Z are not conceived yet.
However, there is no way of choosing between X and Y+Z that ignores that the future occurrence of Z is contingent on the choice and thus hypothetical. Accordingly, population Z has no moral status unless population Y is saved by seawalls.
Notice that, even then, I must believe that population Y will go on to have children Z. This is not a question of whether children Z could be conceived or if I suspect that population Y will have children Z or if I believe that it is Yās option to have children Z. I really have to know that Y will have children Z.
Also notice that, even if I remove beliefs 3 and 4, that does not mean that X or Y populations lose their moral status. A person stuck in suffering has moral status. However, decisions about how to help them will be different.
For example, if putting up seawalls saves Bangladesh from floods but not from drought and famine, I would say that their lives saved and their happiness while alive are in doubt. Similarly in the case of saving the elderly from malaria. If you save them from malaria but they now face worse conditions than suffering malaria, then your extending their lives or happiness while alive are in doubt. Well, in doubt from my perspective.
However, I see nothing wrong with adding to potential for a good life, all other things equal. Iād say that the āall other things equalā only applies when you know very little about the consequences of your actions and your choices are not driven by resource constraints that force difficult decisions.
If:
you are altruistically-minded
you have plenty of resources (for example, bednets and cement) so you donāt have to worry about triage
you donāt have beliefs about what else will happen when you save someoneās life
then it makes sense to help that person (or population). So yeah, supply the bednets and build the seawalls because why not? Who know who will have children or eat meat or cause others harm or suffer a worse disease or die from famine? Maybe everything turns out better, and even if it doesnāt, youāve done no harm by preventing a disease or stopping flooding from sea level rise.