Despite the effectiveness of safety reporting systems (see, e.g., Aviation Safety Reporting System) at identifying weak points in safety protocols and reducing risks of accidents, there does not appear to be an analogous system for biological risks. [1]
Desired Features:
Anonymous reporting
Optional identity verification of reporters (for credibility and whistleblower protection) - Encription of reporter identity (secure multi-party computation?) for increased whistleblower security
Submission of bioinfohazard sequences to a biological risk sequence surveillance organization (e.g., SecureDNA)
Encription of reports containing bioinfohazards
EA Advantages:
Appropriate respect for infohazards and tail risks
“This doesn’t sound like a startup” Agreed, but I decided to err on the side of being overly broad with the definition.
Meta note: Implementing a biological safety reporting system would need reputable institutional backing in order to gain traction. I am not particularly well-positioned to enact or influence adoption of a reporting system nor am I likely well-suited to designing one.
Requirements:
Unverified anonymous reporting would need to be possible, but would likely only be useful for general safety issues (e.g., ACME autoclaves keep failing sterilization tests) or raising awareness of concerns (e.g., I hear that the Akoawak Lab is adapting N1H5 influenza for handshake transmissibility) instead of being immediately actionable.
Identity verification of the reporter should be able to be decoupled from the report and, if they wish to remain anonymous, the key to their identity can remain in their hands. Alternatively, the identity can remain with the reporting system and only be revealed when a specified criteria is met (e.g., BWC investigation, scientific misconduct hearing, a threshold of corroborating reports).
Biological Safety Reporting System:
Despite the effectiveness of safety reporting systems (see, e.g., Aviation Safety Reporting System) at identifying weak points in safety protocols and reducing risks of accidents, there does not appear to be an analogous system for biological risks. [1]
Desired Features:
Anonymous reporting
Optional identity verification of reporters (for credibility and whistleblower protection)
- Encription of reporter identity (secure multi-party computation?) for increased whistleblower security
Submission of bioinfohazard sequences to a biological risk sequence surveillance organization (e.g., SecureDNA)
Encription of reports containing bioinfohazards
EA Advantages:
Appropriate respect for infohazards and tail risks
Synergy with efforts to strengthen the biological weapons convention
The Federal Select Agent Program only applies to a short list of pathogens and does not apply to novel hazards.
This doesn’t sound like a startup but it does sound like a potentially very important (and maybe very easy) software project.
First question:
“Anonymous reporting [+] Optional identity verification of reporters”
This doesn’t seem to go together well.
I understand there are too conflicting needs here:
Make reports reliable so that people will take them seriously
Make reports anonymous so that whistleblowers will use the system (because they know they won’t be exposed)
Could you say much more about the requirements? (Or could you define a “formula” that would accomplish both?
Meta:
Are you a person who could say “yes” to a specific system design here and then if it would be built, you could get it to be used in production?
“This doesn’t sound like a startup”
Agreed, but I decided to err on the side of being overly broad with the definition.
Meta note: Implementing a biological safety reporting system would need reputable institutional backing in order to gain traction. I am not particularly well-positioned to enact or influence adoption of a reporting system nor am I likely well-suited to designing one.
Requirements:
Unverified anonymous reporting would need to be possible, but would likely only be useful for general safety issues (e.g., ACME autoclaves keep failing sterilization tests) or raising awareness of concerns (e.g., I hear that the Akoawak Lab is adapting N1H5 influenza for handshake transmissibility) instead of being immediately actionable.
Identity verification of the reporter should be able to be decoupled from the report and, if they wish to remain anonymous, the key to their identity can remain in their hands. Alternatively, the identity can remain with the reporting system and only be revealed when a specified criteria is met (e.g., BWC investigation, scientific misconduct hearing, a threshold of corroborating reports).