Why I am probably not a longtermist seems like the best of these options, by a very wide margin. The other two posts are much too technical/jargony for introductory audiences.
Also, A longtermist critique of “The expected value of extinction risk reduction is positive” isn’t even a critique of longtermism, it’s a longtermist arguing against one longtermist cause (x-risk reduction) in favor of other longtermist causes (such as s-risk reduction and trajectory change). So it doesn’t seem like a good fit for even a more advanced curriculum unless it was accompanied by other critiques targeting longtermism itself (e.g. critiques based on cluelessness.)
Reducing the probability of human extinction is a highly popular cause area among longtermist EAs. Unfortunately, this sometimes seems to go as far as conflating longtermism with this specific cause, which can contribute to the neglect of other causes.[1] Here, I will evaluate Brauner and Grosse-Holz’s argument for the positive expected value (EV) of extinction risk reduction from a longtermist perspective. I argue that the EV of extinction risk reduction is not robustly positive,[2] such that other longtermist interventions such as s-risk reduction and trajectory changes are more promising, upon consideration of counterarguments to Brauner and Grosse-Holz’s ethical premises and their predictions of the nature of future civilizations.
The longtermist critique is a critique of arguments for a particular (perhaps the main) priority in the longtermism community, extinction risk reduction. I don’t think it’s necessary to endorse longtermism to be sympathetic to the critique. That extinction risk reduction might not be robustly positive is a separate point from the claim that s-risk reduction and trajectory changes are more promising.
Someone could think extinction risk reduction, s-risk reduction and trajectory changes are all not robustly positive, or that no intervention aimed at any of them is robustly positive. The post can be one piece of this, arguing against extinction risk reduction. I’m personally sympathetic to the claim that no longtermist intervention will look robustly positive or extremely cost-effective when you try to deal with the details and indirect effects.
The case for stable very long-lasting trajectory changes other than those related to extinction hasn’t been argued persuasively, as far as I know, in cost-effectiveness terms over, say, animal welfare, and there are lots of large indirect effects to worry about. S-risk work often has potential for backfire, too. Still, I’m personally sympathetic to both enough to want to investigate further, at least over extinction risk reduction.
Why I am probably not a longtermist seems like the best of these options, by a very wide margin. The other two posts are much too technical/jargony for introductory audiences.
Also, A longtermist critique of “The expected value of extinction risk reduction is positive” isn’t even a critique of longtermism, it’s a longtermist arguing against one longtermist cause (x-risk reduction) in favor of other longtermist causes (such as s-risk reduction and trajectory change). So it doesn’t seem like a good fit for even a more advanced curriculum unless it was accompanied by other critiques targeting longtermism itself (e.g. critiques based on cluelessness.)
The longtermist critique is a critique of arguments for a particular (perhaps the main) priority in the longtermism community, extinction risk reduction. I don’t think it’s necessary to endorse longtermism to be sympathetic to the critique. That extinction risk reduction might not be robustly positive is a separate point from the claim that s-risk reduction and trajectory changes are more promising.
Someone could think extinction risk reduction, s-risk reduction and trajectory changes are all not robustly positive, or that no intervention aimed at any of them is robustly positive. The post can be one piece of this, arguing against extinction risk reduction. I’m personally sympathetic to the claim that no longtermist intervention will look robustly positive or extremely cost-effective when you try to deal with the details and indirect effects.
The case for stable very long-lasting trajectory changes other than those related to extinction hasn’t been argued persuasively, as far as I know, in cost-effectiveness terms over, say, animal welfare, and there are lots of large indirect effects to worry about. S-risk work often has potential for backfire, too. Still, I’m personally sympathetic to both enough to want to investigate further, at least over extinction risk reduction.