And public choice theory, too—the kind of “neoliberal cynic legalistic” branch of mechanism design. No point in having a great voting system if your authorities can benefit themselves scot-free. It’s funny how EAs have been arguing about “improving institutional decision-making” for almost a decade (and even before that in LW) w/o reading the basic literature… personal story: I remeber I was fascinated with EY’s Inadequate Equilibria (a wonderful book I recommend even more than HPMOR) and found it super original… but actually it wasn’t nothing new once I discovered the literature in mechanism desing and, more recently, cyberneticists like S. Beer and H. Simon
And public choice theory, too—the kind of “neoliberal cynic legalistic” branch of mechanism design. No point in having a great voting system if your authorities can benefit themselves scot-free.
It’s funny how EAs have been arguing about “improving institutional decision-making” for almost a decade (and even before that in LW) w/o reading the basic literature… personal story: I remeber I was fascinated with EY’s Inadequate Equilibria (a wonderful book I recommend even more than HPMOR) and found it super original… but actually it wasn’t nothing new once I discovered the literature in mechanism desing and, more recently, cyberneticists like S. Beer and H. Simon