I’m going to take a stab at a framework. This is the first time I’ve written this down, so consider this possibly prone to errors and in draft status.
Instead of lumping all types of sexual harassment/abuse together, we could view sexual abuse/harassment as structurally similar to first, second, and third degree homicide, with varying degrees of intent.
Type 1 sexual abuse/harassment may involve calculation and intent. Epstein, Weinstein, and Ratrick’s actions above in studying red pill scripts would fall under Type I. You can see that this behavior was premeditated.
Type 2 sexual abuse/harassment may be analogous to “crimes of passion,” such as a hypothetical guy becoming overtaken with desire and not checking in on the woman. But it is not a premeditated offense.
To be clear, both types are bad. I don’t think parts of Silicon Valley take either type seriously enough. Type 1 and Type 2 is also a spectrum, and repeat offenders may have a mix of both. However, perhaps the offenses should be treated differently.
I think people get squeamish when you try to lump adolescent boy who’s learning boundaries and who is clumsy with consent, but open to correction (Type 2), with someone like Epstein, who is a calculated offender (Type 1). This may also be one reason why the #MeToo movement got cancelled; there may have been a lumping of Type 2 with Type 1 offenders in a way that made some people think parts of the movement were “unreasonable.”
I think restorative justice fails when it is assumed that the offender is a Type 2 offender who is open to correction. But oftentimes, the offender is actually a Type 1 offender who is manipulating his community into thinking he is a Type 2 offender. Or, even if the crimes are not premeditated, they are serial, and the offender is not open to correction but pretends to be, which would make him Type 1.
So perhaps severity of consequences of sexual harassment/abuse should be modulated by: a) “How premeditated was the act?” and b) “Is this a repeated offense?,” which together could classify the offense into a Type 1 or Type 2 offense.
adolescent boy who’s learning boundaries and who is clumsy with consent, but open to correction (Type 2), with someone like Epstein, who is a calculated offender (Type 1)
Two other dimensions your example also illustrates:
Relative power and status: it’s not just that Epstein was intentional in his abuse, but also that he was older, richer, and much better connected.
Relative experience: Epstein had run his process on hundreds of women and girls, with the opportunity to learn from those experiences and adapt his methods.
I think these additional considerations are also doing a lot of work in why people see these two situations differently?
I think there may be a number of related constrcts in play here, such as the culpability of the offender, amenability of the offender to restorative justice techniques, and the appropriate consequences for the offense. Many factors (such as advance planning) will load on all three constructs, although perhaps with somewhat different weights. However, I can think of factors that might load much differently on the different constructs. So one suggestion for more detailed framework building would be to consider whether the factors affect specific constructs differently.
One awkward issue is that the menu of potential consequences will vary depending on the status of the offender. For instance, a civil lawsuit probably isn’t realistically available against a first-year grad student: it’s expensive, and the survivor won’t be able to collect money that the grad student doesn’t have. On the other hand, one could envision methods of reducing future risk without booting the offender from the community that are rather expensive . . . which would require the offender to have resources to pay (or would require the offender to be seen as high-impact enough for a donor to step up to pay to keep the person in the community).[1]
For instance, I submit that in most—probably all—cases in which the offender’s use of psychoactive substances materially contributed to the offense conduct, the offender needs to go substance-free for several years at least. One could monitor compliance with this commitment via hair testing, but it ain’t cheap.
Update:
I’m going to take a stab at a framework. This is the first time I’ve written this down, so consider this possibly prone to errors and in draft status.
Instead of lumping all types of sexual harassment/abuse together, we could view sexual abuse/harassment as structurally similar to first, second, and third degree homicide, with varying degrees of intent.
Type 1 sexual abuse/harassment may involve calculation and intent. Epstein, Weinstein, and Ratrick’s actions above in studying red pill scripts would fall under Type I. You can see that this behavior was premeditated.
Type 2 sexual abuse/harassment may be analogous to “crimes of passion,” such as a hypothetical guy becoming overtaken with desire and not checking in on the woman. But it is not a premeditated offense.
To be clear, both types are bad. I don’t think parts of Silicon Valley take either type seriously enough. Type 1 and Type 2 is also a spectrum, and repeat offenders may have a mix of both. However, perhaps the offenses should be treated differently.
I think people get squeamish when you try to lump adolescent boy who’s learning boundaries and who is clumsy with consent, but open to correction (Type 2), with someone like Epstein, who is a calculated offender (Type 1). This may also be one reason why the #MeToo movement got cancelled; there may have been a lumping of Type 2 with Type 1 offenders in a way that made some people think parts of the movement were “unreasonable.”
I think restorative justice fails when it is assumed that the offender is a Type 2 offender who is open to correction. But oftentimes, the offender is actually a Type 1 offender who is manipulating his community into thinking he is a Type 2 offender. Or, even if the crimes are not premeditated, they are serial, and the offender is not open to correction but pretends to be, which would make him Type 1.
So perhaps severity of consequences of sexual harassment/abuse should be modulated by: a) “How premeditated was the act?” and b) “Is this a repeated offense?,” which together could classify the offense into a Type 1 or Type 2 offense.
Two other dimensions your example also illustrates:
Relative power and status: it’s not just that Epstein was intentional in his abuse, but also that he was older, richer, and much better connected.
Relative experience: Epstein had run his process on hundreds of women and girls, with the opportunity to learn from those experiences and adapt his methods.
I think these additional considerations are also doing a lot of work in why people see these two situations differently?
I think there may be a number of related constrcts in play here, such as the culpability of the offender, amenability of the offender to restorative justice techniques, and the appropriate consequences for the offense. Many factors (such as advance planning) will load on all three constructs, although perhaps with somewhat different weights. However, I can think of factors that might load much differently on the different constructs. So one suggestion for more detailed framework building would be to consider whether the factors affect specific constructs differently.
One awkward issue is that the menu of potential consequences will vary depending on the status of the offender. For instance, a civil lawsuit probably isn’t realistically available against a first-year grad student: it’s expensive, and the survivor won’t be able to collect money that the grad student doesn’t have. On the other hand, one could envision methods of reducing future risk without booting the offender from the community that are rather expensive . . . which would require the offender to have resources to pay (or would require the offender to be seen as high-impact enough for a donor to step up to pay to keep the person in the community).[1]
For instance, I submit that in most—probably all—cases in which the offender’s use of psychoactive substances materially contributed to the offense conduct, the offender needs to go substance-free for several years at least. One could monitor compliance with this commitment via hair testing, but it ain’t cheap.