I’m not an expert but I’d be fairly surprised if the Industrial Revolution didn’t do more to lift people in LMICs out of poverty than any known global health intervention even if you think it increased inequality. Would be open to taking bets on concrete claims here if we can operationalise one well.
I think the Industrial Revolution and other technological explosions very likely did (or will) have an overall anti-poverty impact . . . but I think that impact happened over a considerable amount of time and was not of the magnitude one might have hoped for. In a capitalist system, people who are far removed from the technological improvements often do benefit from them without anyone directing effort at that goal. However, in part because the benefits are indirect, they are often not quick.
So the question isn’t “when will transformational AI exist” but “when will transformational AI have enough of an impact on the wellbeing of economic-development-program beneficiaries that it significantly undermines the expected benefits of those programs?” Before updating too much on the next-few-decades impact of AI on these beneficiaries, I’d want to see concrete evidence of social/legal changes that gave me greater confidence that the benefits of an AI explosion would quickly and significantly reach them. And presumably the people involved in this work modeled a fairly high rate of baseline economic growth in the countries they are working in, so massive AI-caused economic improvement for those beneficiaries (say) 30+ years from now may have relatively modest impact in their models anyway.
I’m not an expert but I’d be fairly surprised if the Industrial Revolution didn’t do more to lift people in LMICs out of poverty than any known global health intervention even if you think it increased inequality. Would be open to taking bets on concrete claims here if we can operationalise one well.
I think the Industrial Revolution and other technological explosions very likely did (or will) have an overall anti-poverty impact . . . but I think that impact happened over a considerable amount of time and was not of the magnitude one might have hoped for. In a capitalist system, people who are far removed from the technological improvements often do benefit from them without anyone directing effort at that goal. However, in part because the benefits are indirect, they are often not quick.
So the question isn’t “when will transformational AI exist” but “when will transformational AI have enough of an impact on the wellbeing of economic-development-program beneficiaries that it significantly undermines the expected benefits of those programs?” Before updating too much on the next-few-decades impact of AI on these beneficiaries, I’d want to see concrete evidence of social/legal changes that gave me greater confidence that the benefits of an AI explosion would quickly and significantly reach them. And presumably the people involved in this work modeled a fairly high rate of baseline economic growth in the countries they are working in, so massive AI-caused economic improvement for those beneficiaries (say) 30+ years from now may have relatively modest impact in their models anyway.