I really appreciate your point about intersubjective tractability. It enters the question of how much should we let empirical and practical considerations spill into our moral preferences (ought implies can for example, does it also imply “in a not extremely hard to coordinate way”?)
At large I’d say that you are talking about how to be an agenty Moral agent. I’m not sure morality requires being agenty, but it certainly benefits from it.
Bias dedication intensity: I meant something ortogonal to optimality. Dedicating only to moral preferences, but more to some that actually don’t have that great of a standing, and less to others which normally do the heavy lifting (don’t you love when philosophers talk about this “heavy lifting”?). So doing it non-optimally.
I really appreciate your point about intersubjective tractability. It enters the question of how much should we let empirical and practical considerations spill into our moral preferences (ought implies can for example, does it also imply “in a not extremely hard to coordinate way”?)
At large I’d say that you are talking about how to be an agenty Moral agent. I’m not sure morality requires being agenty, but it certainly benefits from it.
Bias dedication intensity: I meant something ortogonal to optimality. Dedicating only to moral preferences, but more to some that actually don’t have that great of a standing, and less to others which normally do the heavy lifting (don’t you love when philosophers talk about this “heavy lifting”?). So doing it non-optimally.