In your book you acknowledge the risks of raising awareness on bioweapons, since it can make malicious actors aware of bioweapons, and they might start trying to develop them, but you also decided to raise awareness on bioweapons anyway.
Personally, given that the book is aimed at a general audience, I think this was a bad decision and will have a net effect of making GCBRs more likely.
My question is, was there much discussion with biosecurity experts regarding the risks of discussing pandemic bioweapons in your book?
Yes, we got extensive advice on infohazards from experts on this and other areas, including from people who have both domain expertise and thought a lot about how to communicate about key ideas publicly given info hazard concerns. We were careful not to mention anything that isn’t already in the public discourse.
Hi Will!
In your book you acknowledge the risks of raising awareness on bioweapons, since it can make malicious actors aware of bioweapons, and they might start trying to develop them, but you also decided to raise awareness on bioweapons anyway.
Personally, given that the book is aimed at a general audience, I think this was a bad decision and will have a net effect of making GCBRs more likely.
My question is, was there much discussion with biosecurity experts regarding the risks of discussing pandemic bioweapons in your book?
Yes, we got extensive advice on infohazards from experts on this and other areas, including from people who have both domain expertise and thought a lot about how to communicate about key ideas publicly given info hazard concerns. We were careful not to mention anything that isn’t already in the public discourse.
Good to know, thanks!