Executive summary: This exploratory post argues that “quiet” deontologists—those who personally avoid causing harm but want good outcomes overall—should not try to prevent others from acting consequentially, including by voting or influencing public policy, and should instead step aside so that better outcomes can be achieved by consequentialists.
Key points:
Quiet vs. robust deontology: The author reaffirms that “quiet” deontology permits personal moral scruples but offers no reason to oppose others’ consequentialist actions, unlike “robust” deontology which would seek universal adherence to deontological rules.
Voting thought experiment: In a trolley scenario where a robot pushes based on majority vote, quiet deontologists should abstain from voting rather than stop the consequentialist from saving lives—they want the good outcome but won’t get their own hands dirty.
Policy implications: Quiet deontologists should not obstruct or criticize consequentialist-friendly policies (e.g. kidney markets, challenge trials) because others’ morally “wrong” actions don’t implicate them and achieve better outcomes.
Moral advice roles: Deontologists should avoid public ethical advisory roles (like on bioethics councils) if they oppose promoting beneficial policies; they should recommend consequentialists instead.
Sociological claim: Most academic deontologists already accept the quiet view, which implies they should be disturbed by the real-world harm caused by deontological arguments used in policy.
Call to reflection: The author challenges deontologists to explain why, if they privately hope for better outcomes, they act to prevent others from bringing those outcomes about.
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Executive summary: This exploratory post argues that “quiet” deontologists—those who personally avoid causing harm but want good outcomes overall—should not try to prevent others from acting consequentially, including by voting or influencing public policy, and should instead step aside so that better outcomes can be achieved by consequentialists.
Key points:
Quiet vs. robust deontology: The author reaffirms that “quiet” deontology permits personal moral scruples but offers no reason to oppose others’ consequentialist actions, unlike “robust” deontology which would seek universal adherence to deontological rules.
Voting thought experiment: In a trolley scenario where a robot pushes based on majority vote, quiet deontologists should abstain from voting rather than stop the consequentialist from saving lives—they want the good outcome but won’t get their own hands dirty.
Policy implications: Quiet deontologists should not obstruct or criticize consequentialist-friendly policies (e.g. kidney markets, challenge trials) because others’ morally “wrong” actions don’t implicate them and achieve better outcomes.
Moral advice roles: Deontologists should avoid public ethical advisory roles (like on bioethics councils) if they oppose promoting beneficial policies; they should recommend consequentialists instead.
Sociological claim: Most academic deontologists already accept the quiet view, which implies they should be disturbed by the real-world harm caused by deontological arguments used in policy.
Call to reflection: The author challenges deontologists to explain why, if they privately hope for better outcomes, they act to prevent others from bringing those outcomes about.
This comment was auto-generated by the EA Forum Team. Feel free to point out issues with this summary by replying to the comment, and contact us if you have feedback.