This is a really thoughtful call to grow the biosecurity field. One thing that might deserve a bit more attention is how this work expands beyond the small group of countries where most biosecurity research and institutions are currently concentrated.
In many low- and middle-income settings, pathogen surveillance infrastructure is still quite limited. Because of this, local researchers often have fewer opportunities to engage in biosecurity work, not necessarily due to a lack of interest or talent, but because there are fewer platforms for experimentation and collaboration.
One possible direction could be supporting simpler, lower-infrastructure surveillance pilots that can act both as early-warning systems and as starting points for building local research communities. For instance, pooled nasal-swab sentinel surveillance, indoor air sampling in crowded environments like schools or clinics, or environmental sampling in markets and farms could be practical approaches in places where wastewater monitoring or continuous sequencing systems are not yet feasible.
Programs like these could strengthen pathogen detection while also helping to grow a wider community of researchers working on biosecurity challenges. If biosecurity field-building is meant to be truly global, some of the greatest opportunities may lie in enabling experimentation and community formation in under-surveilled ecosystems, rather than concentrating most efforts in places that are already well resourced.
I am personally very interested in exploring and piloting initiatives along these lines in resource-limited settings. If anyone working in biosecurity field-building, surveillance, or global health is interested in collaborating on efforts in LMIC contexts, I would be very happy to connect. You can reach me at eennadi@gmail.com.
This is a really thoughtful call to grow the biosecurity field. One thing that might deserve a bit more attention is how this work expands beyond the small group of countries where most biosecurity research and institutions are currently concentrated.
In many low- and middle-income settings, pathogen surveillance infrastructure is still quite limited. Because of this, local researchers often have fewer opportunities to engage in biosecurity work, not necessarily due to a lack of interest or talent, but because there are fewer platforms for experimentation and collaboration.
One possible direction could be supporting simpler, lower-infrastructure surveillance pilots that can act both as early-warning systems and as starting points for building local research communities. For instance, pooled nasal-swab sentinel surveillance, indoor air sampling in crowded environments like schools or clinics, or environmental sampling in markets and farms could be practical approaches in places where wastewater monitoring or continuous sequencing systems are not yet feasible.
Programs like these could strengthen pathogen detection while also helping to grow a wider community of researchers working on biosecurity challenges. If biosecurity field-building is meant to be truly global, some of the greatest opportunities may lie in enabling experimentation and community formation in under-surveilled ecosystems, rather than concentrating most efforts in places that are already well resourced.
I am personally very interested in exploring and piloting initiatives along these lines in resource-limited settings. If anyone working in biosecurity field-building, surveillance, or global health is interested in collaborating on efforts in LMIC contexts, I would be very happy to connect. You can reach me at eennadi@gmail.com.