The problem is that one manās modus ponens is another manās modus tollens.
Fair :) I admit Iām apparently unusually inclined to the modus ponens end of these dilemmas.
If thereās a part of a theory that is of very little practical use, but is still seen as a strong point against the theory, we should try find a version without it.
I think this depends on whether the version without it is internally consistent. But more to the point, the question about the value of strangers does seem practically relevant. It influences how much youāre willing to effectively donate rather than spend on fancy gifts, for example, giving (far?) greater marginal returns of well-being to strangers than to loved ones. Ironically, if weāre not impartial, it seems our loved ones are āutility monstersā in a sense. (Of course, you could still have some nonzero partiality while agreeing that the average person doesnāt donate nearly enough.)
I find this as troubling as anyone else who cares deeply about their family and friends, certainly. But Iām inclined to think itās even more troubling that other sentient beings suffer needlessly because of my personal attachmentsā¦ Ethics need not be easy.
Thereās also the argument that optimal altruism is facilitated by having some baseline of self-indulgence, to avoid burnout, but 1) I think this argument can be taken too far into the realm of convenient rationalization, and 2) this doesnāt require any actual partiality baked into the moral system. Itās just that partial attachments are instrumentally useful.
Fair :) I admit Iām apparently unusually inclined to the modus ponens end of these dilemmas.
I think this depends on whether the version without it is internally consistent. But more to the point, the question about the value of strangers does seem practically relevant. It influences how much youāre willing to effectively donate rather than spend on fancy gifts, for example, giving (far?) greater marginal returns of well-being to strangers than to loved ones. Ironically, if weāre not impartial, it seems our loved ones are āutility monstersā in a sense. (Of course, you could still have some nonzero partiality while agreeing that the average person doesnāt donate nearly enough.)
I find this as troubling as anyone else who cares deeply about their family and friends, certainly. But Iām inclined to think itās even more troubling that other sentient beings suffer needlessly because of my personal attachmentsā¦ Ethics need not be easy.
Thereās also the argument that optimal altruism is facilitated by having some baseline of self-indulgence, to avoid burnout, but 1) I think this argument can be taken too far into the realm of convenient rationalization, and 2) this doesnāt require any actual partiality baked into the moral system. Itās just that partial attachments are instrumentally useful.