The problem is that one man’s modus ponens is another man’s modus tollens.
Fair :) I admit I’m apparently unusually inclined to the modus ponens end of these dilemmas.
If there’s a part of a theory that is of very little practical use, but is still seen as a strong point against the theory, we should try find a version without it.
I think this depends on whether the version without it is internally consistent. But more to the point, the question about the value of strangers does seem practically relevant. It influences how much you’re willing to effectively donate rather than spend on fancy gifts, for example, giving (far?) greater marginal returns of well-being to strangers than to loved ones. Ironically, if we’re not impartial, it seems our loved ones are “utility monsters” in a sense. (Of course, you could still have some nonzero partiality while agreeing that the average person doesn’t donate nearly enough.)
I find this as troubling as anyone else who cares deeply about their family and friends, certainly. But I’m inclined to think it’s even more troubling that other sentient beings suffer needlessly because of my personal attachments… Ethics need not be easy.
There’s also the argument that optimal altruism is facilitated by having some baseline of self-indulgence, to avoid burnout, but 1) I think this argument can be taken too far into the realm of convenient rationalization, and 2) this doesn’t require any actual partiality baked into the moral system. It’s just that partial attachments are instrumentally useful.
Fair :) I admit I’m apparently unusually inclined to the modus ponens end of these dilemmas.
I think this depends on whether the version without it is internally consistent. But more to the point, the question about the value of strangers does seem practically relevant. It influences how much you’re willing to effectively donate rather than spend on fancy gifts, for example, giving (far?) greater marginal returns of well-being to strangers than to loved ones. Ironically, if we’re not impartial, it seems our loved ones are “utility monsters” in a sense. (Of course, you could still have some nonzero partiality while agreeing that the average person doesn’t donate nearly enough.)
I find this as troubling as anyone else who cares deeply about their family and friends, certainly. But I’m inclined to think it’s even more troubling that other sentient beings suffer needlessly because of my personal attachments… Ethics need not be easy.
There’s also the argument that optimal altruism is facilitated by having some baseline of self-indulgence, to avoid burnout, but 1) I think this argument can be taken too far into the realm of convenient rationalization, and 2) this doesn’t require any actual partiality baked into the moral system. It’s just that partial attachments are instrumentally useful.