I think the studies you refer to may underrate the importance of IQ for good epistemics.
First, as I mentioned in my other comment, the correlation between IQ-like measures and the most comprehensive test of rationality was as high as 0.695. This is especially noteworthy considering the fact that Stanovich in particular (I haven’t followed the others’ work) has for a long time argued along your lines—that there are many things that IQ tests miss. So if anything one would expect him to be biased in the direction of a too low correlation.
Second, psychological studies of confirmation bias and other biases tend to study participants’ reactions to short vignettes. They don’t follow participants over longer periods of time. And I think this may lead them to underrate the importance of intelligence for good epistemics; in particular in communities like the effective altruism and rationalist communities.
I think that people can to some extent (though certainly not fully) overcome conformation bias and other biases through being alert to them (not the least in interpersonal discussions), through forming better mental habits, through building better epistemic institutions, and so on. This work is, however, quite cognitively demanding, and I would expect more intelligent people to be substantially better at it. Less intelligent people are likely not as good as engaging in the kind of reflection on their own and others’ thought-processes to get these kinds of efforts off the ground. I think that the effective altruist and rationalist communities are unusually good at it: they are constantly on the lookout for biased reasoning, and often engage in meta-discussions about their own and each others’ reasoning—whether they, e.g. show signs of confirmation bias. And I think a big reason why that works so well is that these communities are comprised by so many intelligent people.
In general, I think that IQ is tremendously important and not overrated by effective altruists.
I think the studies you refer to may underrate the importance of IQ for good epistemics.
First, as I mentioned in my other comment, the correlation between IQ-like measures and the most comprehensive test of rationality was as high as 0.695. This is especially noteworthy considering the fact that Stanovich in particular (I haven’t followed the others’ work) has for a long time argued along your lines—that there are many things that IQ tests miss. So if anything one would expect him to be biased in the direction of a too low correlation.
Second, psychological studies of confirmation bias and other biases tend to study participants’ reactions to short vignettes. They don’t follow participants over longer periods of time. And I think this may lead them to underrate the importance of intelligence for good epistemics; in particular in communities like the effective altruism and rationalist communities.
I think that people can to some extent (though certainly not fully) overcome conformation bias and other biases through being alert to them (not the least in interpersonal discussions), through forming better mental habits, through building better epistemic institutions, and so on. This work is, however, quite cognitively demanding, and I would expect more intelligent people to be substantially better at it. Less intelligent people are likely not as good as engaging in the kind of reflection on their own and others’ thought-processes to get these kinds of efforts off the ground. I think that the effective altruist and rationalist communities are unusually good at it: they are constantly on the lookout for biased reasoning, and often engage in meta-discussions about their own and each others’ reasoning—whether they, e.g. show signs of confirmation bias. And I think a big reason why that works so well is that these communities are comprised by so many intelligent people.
In general, I think that IQ is tremendously important and not overrated by effective altruists.