PS: I tried to convey that in the Introduction by saying that āmitigating existential risk as cost-effectively as possible does not correspond to FPās mission[2]ā.
PPS: I have now edited the Introduction to point to your and Mattā comments, and thus better describe FPās goals. I no longer mention that āmitigating existential risk as cost-effectively as possible does not correspond to FPās missionā.
Thanks for all of your work on this analysis, Vasco. We appreciate your thoroughness and your willingness to engage with us beforehand. The work is obviously methodologically sound and, as Johannes indicated, we generally agree that climate is not among the top bets for reducing existential risk.
I think that āmitigating existential risk as cost-effectively as possibleā is entailed by the goal of doing as much good as possible in the world, which is why FP exists. To be absolutely clear, FPās goal is to do the maximum possible amount of good, and to do so in a cause-neutral way.
A common misconception about our research agenda is that it is driven by the interests of our members. This is most assuredly not the case. To some degree, member-driven research was a component of previous iterations of the research team, and our movement away from this is indeed a relatively recent change. There remain some exceptions, but as a general rule we do not devote research resources to any cause area or charity investigation unless we have a good reason to suspect it might be genuinely valuable from a strictly cause-neutral standpoint.
Still, FP does operate under some constraints, one of which is that many of our 1700 members are not cause-neutral. This is by design. We facilitate our membersā charitable giving to all (legal and feasible) grantees in hopes that we can influence some portion of this money toward highly effective ends. This works. Since our members are often not EAs, such giving is strictly counterfactual: in the absence of FPās recommendations, it simply would not have been given to effective charities.
Climate plays two roles in a portfolio that is constrained in this way. First, it introduces members who are not cause-neutral to our way of thinking about problems and solutions, which builds credibility and opens the door to further education on cause areas that might not immediately resonate with them (e.g. AI risk). This also works. Second, it reallocates non-cause-neutral funds to the most effective opportunities within a cause area in which the vast majority of philanthropic funds are, unfortunately, misspent. As I have tried to work out in my Shortform, this reallocation can be cost-effective under certain conditions even within otherwise unpromising cause areas (of which climate is not one).
Finally, I do want to emphasize that the Climate Fund does not serve a strictly instrumental role. We genuinely think that the climate grants we make and recommend are a comparatively cost-effective way to improve the value of the long-term future, though not the most cost-effective way. I donāt see any particular tension in that: every EA charity evaluator (or grantmaker) recommends (or grants to) options across a wide range of cost-effectiveness. From our perspective, the Climate Fund is better than most things, but not as good as the best things.
Thanks, Matt! I think the above is a very valuable explanation of FPās mission, and have edited the last 2 paragraphs of the Introduction to point to your and Johannesā comments.
Thanks for clarifying, Johannes!
PS: I tried to convey that in the Introduction by saying that āmitigating existential risk as cost-effectively as possible does not correspond to FPās mission[2]ā.
PPS: I have now edited the Introduction to point to your and Mattā comments, and thus better describe FPās goals. I no longer mention that āmitigating existential risk as cost-effectively as possible does not correspond to FPās missionā.
(I am research director at FP)
Thanks for all of your work on this analysis, Vasco. We appreciate your thoroughness and your willingness to engage with us beforehand. The work is obviously methodologically sound and, as Johannes indicated, we generally agree that climate is not among the top bets for reducing existential risk.
I think that āmitigating existential risk as cost-effectively as possibleā is entailed by the goal of doing as much good as possible in the world, which is why FP exists. To be absolutely clear, FPās goal is to do the maximum possible amount of good, and to do so in a cause-neutral way.
A common misconception about our research agenda is that it is driven by the interests of our members. This is most assuredly not the case. To some degree, member-driven research was a component of previous iterations of the research team, and our movement away from this is indeed a relatively recent change. There remain some exceptions, but as a general rule we do not devote research resources to any cause area or charity investigation unless we have a good reason to suspect it might be genuinely valuable from a strictly cause-neutral standpoint.
Still, FP does operate under some constraints, one of which is that many of our 1700 members are not cause-neutral. This is by design. We facilitate our membersā charitable giving to all (legal and feasible) grantees in hopes that we can influence some portion of this money toward highly effective ends. This works. Since our members are often not EAs, such giving is strictly counterfactual: in the absence of FPās recommendations, it simply would not have been given to effective charities.
Climate plays two roles in a portfolio that is constrained in this way. First, it introduces members who are not cause-neutral to our way of thinking about problems and solutions, which builds credibility and opens the door to further education on cause areas that might not immediately resonate with them (e.g. AI risk). This also works. Second, it reallocates non-cause-neutral funds to the most effective opportunities within a cause area in which the vast majority of philanthropic funds are, unfortunately, misspent. As I have tried to work out in my Shortform, this reallocation can be cost-effective under certain conditions even within otherwise unpromising cause areas (of which climate is not one).
Finally, I do want to emphasize that the Climate Fund does not serve a strictly instrumental role. We genuinely think that the climate grants we make and recommend are a comparatively cost-effective way to improve the value of the long-term future, though not the most cost-effective way. I donāt see any particular tension in that: every EA charity evaluator (or grantmaker) recommends (or grants to) options across a wide range of cost-effectiveness. From our perspective, the Climate Fund is better than most things, but not as good as the best things.
Thanks, Matt! I think the above is a very valuable explanation of FPās mission, and have edited the last 2 paragraphs of the Introduction to point to your and Johannesā comments.