P1 claims that c-preferences can only be normatively justified by arguing that one option has better “expected” consequences.
The objections you’re referring to are all implicitly of the form, “We should always c-prefer either A or B (or be indifferent) because of [some reason other than a comparison of the ‘expected’ consequences].”
E.g. in the first row, [some reason other than a comparison of the ‘expected’ consequences] = “we always have to choose something”.
Hi Toby, glad it was helpful!
Fair question — the idea is:
P1 claims that c-preferences can only be normatively justified by arguing that one option has better “expected” consequences.
The objections you’re referring to are all implicitly of the form, “We should always c-prefer either A or B (or be indifferent) because of [some reason other than a comparison of the ‘expected’ consequences].”
E.g. in the first row, [some reason other than a comparison of the ‘expected’ consequences] = “we always have to choose something”.
I’ll add a note on this to the post itself.
I see, thanks!