How sensitive are these conclusions to the ethical views of future people? E.g. what if people in the future are mostly deontologists or have asymmetric population ethics (so may not be motivated to create lots of high welfare beings), and we still evaluate in total utilitarian terms?
Hi Michael, I wrote this 2 years ago and have not worked in this area afterwards. To give a really good answer, Iโd probably have to spend several hours reading the text again. But from memory, I think that most arguments donโt rest on the assumption of future agents being total utilitarians. In particular, none of the arguments requires the assumption that future agents will create lots of high welfare beings. So I guess the same conclusions follow if you assume deontologist future agents, or ones with asymmetric population ethics. This is particularly true if you think that your idealised, reflected preferences would be close to that of the future agents.
How sensitive are these conclusions to the ethical views of future people? E.g. what if people in the future are mostly deontologists or have asymmetric population ethics (so may not be motivated to create lots of high welfare beings), and we still evaluate in total utilitarian terms?
Hi Michael, I wrote this 2 years ago and have not worked in this area afterwards. To give a really good answer, Iโd probably have to spend several hours reading the text again. But from memory, I think that most arguments donโt rest on the assumption of future agents being total utilitarians. In particular, none of the arguments requires the assumption that future agents will create lots of high welfare beings. So I guess the same conclusions follow if you assume deontologist future agents, or ones with asymmetric population ethics. This is particularly true if you think that your idealised, reflected preferences would be close to that of the future agents.