And the suffering-focused perspective may simply add that this also holds for what we call positive experiences (quote from footnote 49 here)
Although this is an interesting argument, I think it fails against the most plausible versions of hedonistic utilitarianism. The reason I think pleasant experiences are intrinsically good is simply that I believe I can apprehend their goodness directly, by becoming immediately acquainted with how those experiences feel like. This is exactly the same mechanism that I think gives me access to the intrinsic badness of unpleasant experiences. I think it’s much harder to debunk a belief in the intrinsic goodness of pleasantness rooted in this kind of immediate acquaintance, than it is to debunk beliefs about the value of other objects whose goodness cannot be directly introspected. But should I become persuaded that the debunking arguments could be extended to my beliefs about the goodness of pleasant experience, I would become persuaded that my beliefs about the badness of unpleasant experience are also debunkable. So the argument gives no dialectical advantage to the negative utilitarian vis-à-vis this type of hedonistic utilitarian.
Although this is an interesting argument, I think it fails against the most plausible versions of hedonistic utilitarianism. The reason I think pleasant experiences are intrinsically good is simply that I believe I can apprehend their goodness directly, by becoming immediately acquainted with how those experiences feel like. This is exactly the same mechanism that I think gives me access to the intrinsic badness of unpleasant experiences. I think it’s much harder to debunk a belief in the intrinsic goodness of pleasantness rooted in this kind of immediate acquaintance, than it is to debunk beliefs about the value of other objects whose goodness cannot be directly introspected. But should I become persuaded that the debunking arguments could be extended to my beliefs about the goodness of pleasant experience, I would become persuaded that my beliefs about the badness of unpleasant experience are also debunkable. So the argument gives no dialectical advantage to the negative utilitarian vis-à-vis this type of hedonistic utilitarian.