Contra hard moral anti-realism: a rough sequence of claims
Epistemic and provenance note: This post should not be taken as an attempt at a complete refutation of moral anti-realism, but rather as a set of observations and intuitions that may or may not give one pause as to the wisdom of taking a hard moral anti-realist stance. I may clean it up to construct a more formal argument in the future. I wrote it on a whim as a Telegram message, in direct response to the claim
> âyou canât find âvaluesâ in realityâ.
Yet, you can find valence in your own experiences (that is, you just know from direct experience whether you like the sensations you are experiencing or not), and you can assume other people are likely to have a similar enough stimulus-valence mapping. (Example: Iâm willing to bet 2k USD on my part against a single dollar yours that that if I waterboard you, youâll want to stop before 3 minutes have passed.)[1]
However, since we humans are bounded imperfect rationalists, trying to explicitly optimize valence is often a dumb strategy. Evolution has made us not into fitness-maximizers, nor valence-maximizers, but adaptation-executers.
âvaluesâ originate as (thus are) reifications of heuristics that reliably increase long term valence in the real world (subject to memetic selection pressures, among them social desirability of utterances, adaptativeness of behavioral effects, etc.)
If you find yourself terminally valuing something that is not someoneâs experienced valence, then either one of these propositions is likely true:
A nonsentient process has at some point had write access to your values.
What you value is a means to improving somebodyâs experienced valence, and so are you now.
Contra hard moral anti-realism: a rough sequence of claims
Epistemic and provenance note: This post should not be taken as an attempt at a complete refutation of moral anti-realism, but rather as a set of observations and intuitions that may or may not give one pause as to the wisdom of taking a hard moral anti-realist stance. I may clean it up to construct a more formal argument in the future. I wrote it on a whim as a Telegram message, in direct response to the claim
> âyou canât find âvaluesâ in realityâ.
Yet, you can find valence in your own experiences (that is, you just know from direct experience whether you like the sensations you are experiencing or not), and you can assume other people are likely to have a similar enough stimulus-valence mapping. (Example: Iâm willing to bet 2k USD on my part against a single dollar yours that that if I waterboard you, youâll want to stop before 3 minutes have passed.)[1]
However, since we humans are bounded imperfect rationalists, trying to explicitly optimize valence is often a dumb strategy. Evolution has made us not into fitness-maximizers, nor valence-maximizers, but adaptation-executers.
âvaluesâ originate as (thus are) reifications of heuristics that reliably increase long term valence in the real world (subject to memetic selection pressures, among them social desirability of utterances, adaptativeness of behavioral effects, etc.)
If you find yourself terminally valuing something that is not someoneâs experienced valence, then either one of these propositions is likely true:
A nonsentient process has at some point had write access to your values.
What you value is a means to improving somebodyâs experienced valence, and so are you now.
crossposted from lesswrong
In retrospect, making this proposition was a bit crass on my part.