1) I donât closely follow the current state of play in terms of âshorttermistâ evaluation. The reply I hope (e.g.) a Givewell Analyst would make to (e.g.) âWhy arenât you factoring in impacts on climate change for these interventions?â would be some mix of:
a) âWe have looked at this, and weâre confident we can bound the magnitude of this effect to pretty negligible values, so we neglect them in our write-ups etc.â
b) âWe tried looking into this, but our uncertainty is highly resilient (and our best guess doesnât vary appreciably between interventions) so we get higher yield investigating other things.â
c) âWe are explicit our analysis is predicated on moral (e.g. âhuman lives are so much more important than animals lives any impact on the latter is ~mootâ) or epistemic (e.g. some âcommon sense anti-cluelessnessâ position) claims which either we corporately endorse and/âor our audience typically endorses.â
Perhaps such hopes would be generally disappointed.
2) Similar to above, I donât object to (re. animals) positions like âOur view is this consideration isnât a concern as Xâ or âGiven this consideration, we target Y rather than Zâ, or âAlthough we aim for A, B is a very good proxy indicator for A which we use in comparative evaluation.â
But I at least used to see folks appeal to motivations which obviate (inverse/â) logic of the larder issues, particularly re. diet change (âSure, itâs actually really unclear becoming vegan reduces or increases animal suffering overall, but the reason to be vegan is to signal concern for animals and so influence broader societal attitudes, and this effect is much more important and what weâre aiming forâ). Yet this overriding motivation typically only âcame upâ in the context of this discussion, and corollary questions like:
* âIs maximizing short term farmed animal welfare the best way of furthering this crucial goal of attitude change?â
* âIs encouraging carnivores to adopt a vegan diet the best way to influence attitudes?â
*âShouldnât we try and avoid an intervention like v*ganism which credibly harms those we are urging concern for, as this might look bad/âbe bad by the lights of many/âmost non-consequentialist views?â
seemed seldom asked.
Naturally I hope this is a relic of my perhaps jaundiced memory.
a) âWe have looked at this, and weâre confident we can bound the magnitude of this effect to pretty negligible values, so we neglect them in our write-ups etc.â
80,000 Hours and Toby Ord at least think that climate change could be an existential risk, and 80,000 Hours ranks it as a higher priority than global health and poverty, so I think itâs not obvious that the effects would be negligible (assuming total utilitarianism, say) if they tried to work through it, although they might still think so. Other responses they might give:
GiveWell-recommended charities mitigate x-risk more than they worsen them or do more good for the far future in other ways. Maybe thereâs a longtermist case for growth. It doesnât seem 80,000 Hours really believes this, though, or else health in poor countries would be higher up. Also, this seems like suspicious convergence, but they could still think the charities are justified primarily by short-term effects, if they think the long-term ones are plausibly close to 0 in expectation. Or,
GiveWell discounts the lives of future people (e.g. with person-affecting views, possibly asymmetric ones, although climate change could still be important on some person-affecting views), which falls under your point c). I think this is a plausible explanation for GiveWellâs views based on what Iâve seen.
I think another good response (although not the one Iâd expect) is that they donât need to be confident the charities do more good than harm in expectation, since itâs actually very cheap to mitigate any possible risks from climate change from them by also donating to effective climate change charities, even if youâre deeply uncertain about how important climate change is. I discuss this approach more here. The result would be that youâre pretty sure youâre doing some decent minimum of good in expectation (from the health effects), whereas just the global health and poverty charity would be plausibly bad (due to climate change), and just the climate change charity would be plausibly close to 0 in expectation (due to deep uncertainty about the importance of climate change).
But I at least used to see folks appeal to motivations which obviate (inverse/â) logic of the larder issues, particularly re. diet change (âSure, itâs actually really unclear becoming vegan reduces or increases animal suffering overall, but the reason to be vegan is to signal concern for animals and so influence broader societal attitudes, and this effect is much more important and what weâre aiming forâ). Yet this overriding motivation typically only âcame upâ in the context of this discussion
This is fair, and I expect that this still happens, but who was saying this? Is this how the animal charities (or their employees) themselves responded to these concerns? I think itâs plausible many did just think the short term benefits for farmed animals outweighed any effects on wild animals.
âIs maximizing short term farmed animal welfare the best way of furthering this crucial goal of attitude change?â
With respect to things other than diet, I donât think EAs are assuming it is, and they are separately looking for the best approaches to attitude change, so this doesnât seem important to ask. Corporate campaigns are primarily justified on the basis of their welfare effects for farmed animals, and still look good if you also include short term effects on wild animals. Other more promising approaches towards attitude change have been supported, like The Nonhuman Rights Project (previously an ACE Standout charity, and still a grantee), and plant-based substitutes and cultured meat (e.g. GFI).
âIs encouraging carnivores to adopt a vegan diet the best way to influence attitudes?â
I do think itâs among the best ways, depending on the approach, and I think people were already thinking this outside of the context of this discussion. I think eating animals causes speciesism and apathy, and is a significant psychological barrier to helping animals, farmed and wild. Becoming vegan (for many, not all) is a commitment to actively caring about animals, and can become part of someoneâs identity. EAA has put a lot into the development of substitutes, especially through GFI, and these are basically our main hopes for influencing attitudes and also one of our best shots at eliminating factory farming.
I donât think this is suspicious convergence. There are other promising approaches (like the Nonhuman Rights Project), but itâs hard enough to compare them directly that I donât think any are clearly better, so Iâd endorse supporting multiple approaches, including diet change.
âShouldnât we try and avoid an intervention like v*ganism which credibly harms those we are urging concern for, as this might look bad/âbe bad by the lights of many/âmost non-consequentialist views?â
I think the case for veganism is much stronger according to the most common non-consequentialist views (that still care about animals), because they often distinguish
intentional harms and exploitation/âusing others as mere means to ends, cruelty and supporting cruelty, from
incidental harms and harms from omissions, like more nonhuman animals being born because we are not farming some animals more.
Of course, advocacy is not an omission, and what you suggest is also plausible.
[Mea culpa re. messing up the formatting again]
1) I donât closely follow the current state of play in terms of âshorttermistâ evaluation. The reply I hope (e.g.) a Givewell Analyst would make to (e.g.) âWhy arenât you factoring in impacts on climate change for these interventions?â would be some mix of:
a) âWe have looked at this, and weâre confident we can bound the magnitude of this effect to pretty negligible values, so we neglect them in our write-ups etc.â
b) âWe tried looking into this, but our uncertainty is highly resilient (and our best guess doesnât vary appreciably between interventions) so we get higher yield investigating other things.â
c) âWe are explicit our analysis is predicated on moral (e.g. âhuman lives are so much more important than animals lives any impact on the latter is ~mootâ) or epistemic (e.g. some âcommon sense anti-cluelessnessâ position) claims which either we corporately endorse and/âor our audience typically endorses.â
Perhaps such hopes would be generally disappointed.
2) Similar to above, I donât object to (re. animals) positions like âOur view is this consideration isnât a concern as Xâ or âGiven this consideration, we target Y rather than Zâ, or âAlthough we aim for A, B is a very good proxy indicator for A which we use in comparative evaluation.â
But I at least used to see folks appeal to motivations which obviate (inverse/â) logic of the larder issues, particularly re. diet change (âSure, itâs actually really unclear becoming vegan reduces or increases animal suffering overall, but the reason to be vegan is to signal concern for animals and so influence broader societal attitudes, and this effect is much more important and what weâre aiming forâ). Yet this overriding motivation typically only âcame upâ in the context of this discussion, and corollary questions like:
* âIs maximizing short term farmed animal welfare the best way of furthering this crucial goal of attitude change?â
* âIs encouraging carnivores to adopt a vegan diet the best way to influence attitudes?â
* âShouldnât we try and avoid an intervention like v*ganism which credibly harms those we are urging concern for, as this might look bad/âbe bad by the lights of many/âmost non-consequentialist views?â
seemed seldom asked.
Naturally I hope this is a relic of my perhaps jaundiced memory.
80,000 Hours and Toby Ord at least think that climate change could be an existential risk, and 80,000 Hours ranks it as a higher priority than global health and poverty, so I think itâs not obvious that the effects would be negligible (assuming total utilitarianism, say) if they tried to work through it, although they might still think so. Other responses they might give:
GiveWell-recommended charities mitigate x-risk more than they worsen them or do more good for the far future in other ways. Maybe thereâs a longtermist case for growth. It doesnât seem 80,000 Hours really believes this, though, or else health in poor countries would be higher up. Also, this seems like suspicious convergence, but they could still think the charities are justified primarily by short-term effects, if they think the long-term ones are plausibly close to 0 in expectation. Or,
GiveWell discounts the lives of future people (e.g. with person-affecting views, possibly asymmetric ones, although climate change could still be important on some person-affecting views), which falls under your point c). I think this is a plausible explanation for GiveWellâs views based on what Iâve seen.
I think another good response (although not the one Iâd expect) is that they donât need to be confident the charities do more good than harm in expectation, since itâs actually very cheap to mitigate any possible risks from climate change from them by also donating to effective climate change charities, even if youâre deeply uncertain about how important climate change is. I discuss this approach more here. The result would be that youâre pretty sure youâre doing some decent minimum of good in expectation (from the health effects), whereas just the global health and poverty charity would be plausibly bad (due to climate change), and just the climate change charity would be plausibly close to 0 in expectation (due to deep uncertainty about the importance of climate change).
This is fair, and I expect that this still happens, but who was saying this? Is this how the animal charities (or their employees) themselves responded to these concerns? I think itâs plausible many did just think the short term benefits for farmed animals outweighed any effects on wild animals.
With respect to things other than diet, I donât think EAs are assuming it is, and they are separately looking for the best approaches to attitude change, so this doesnât seem important to ask. Corporate campaigns are primarily justified on the basis of their welfare effects for farmed animals, and still look good if you also include short term effects on wild animals. Other more promising approaches towards attitude change have been supported, like The Nonhuman Rights Project (previously an ACE Standout charity, and still a grantee), and plant-based substitutes and cultured meat (e.g. GFI).
I do think itâs among the best ways, depending on the approach, and I think people were already thinking this outside of the context of this discussion. I think eating animals causes speciesism and apathy, and is a significant psychological barrier to helping animals, farmed and wild. Becoming vegan (for many, not all) is a commitment to actively caring about animals, and can become part of someoneâs identity. EAA has put a lot into the development of substitutes, especially through GFI, and these are basically our main hopes for influencing attitudes and also one of our best shots at eliminating factory farming.
I donât think this is suspicious convergence. There are other promising approaches (like the Nonhuman Rights Project), but itâs hard enough to compare them directly that I donât think any are clearly better, so Iâd endorse supporting multiple approaches, including diet change.
I think the case for veganism is much stronger according to the most common non-consequentialist views (that still care about animals), because they often distinguish
intentional harms and exploitation/âusing others as mere means to ends, cruelty and supporting cruelty, from
incidental harms and harms from omissions, like more nonhuman animals being born because we are not farming some animals more.
Of course, advocacy is not an omission, and what you suggest is also plausible.