Another trusted party signing data is mail providers (DKIM), in particular mail sent through Google is signed. Google can’t repudiate these signatures, but you have to trust them not to write new history. Matthew Green calls for the opposite: for Google to publish its old private keys to destroy this information.
… mail sent through Google is signed. Google can’t repudiate these signatures, but you have to trust them not to write new history. Matthew Green calls for the opposite: for Google to publish its old private keys to destroy this information.
Interesting take on the dangers of strong validation. I note that time-stamping the signatures would prevent Google both from writing new history, and from doing what Mr Green wants.
I haven’t taken the time to consider whether Mr Green’s point is valid, but i instinctively hope it isn’t because of what it would mean for the value of aiding truth-seeking.
Another trusted party signing data is mail providers (DKIM), in particular mail sent through Google is signed. Google can’t repudiate these signatures, but you have to trust them not to write new history. Matthew Green calls for the opposite: for Google to publish its old private keys to destroy this information.
Interesting take on the dangers of strong validation. I note that time-stamping the signatures would prevent Google both from writing new history, and from doing what Mr Green wants.
I haven’t taken the time to consider whether Mr Green’s point is valid, but i instinctively hope it isn’t because of what it would mean for the value of aiding truth-seeking.