I would have a lot less concern about more central control of funding within EA if there was more genuine interest within those funding circles for broad exploration and development of evidence from new ideas within the community. Currently, I think there are a handful of (very good) notions about areas that are the most promising (anthropogenic short-term existential or major risks like AI, nuclear weapons, pandemics/bioweapons, animal welfare, global health, and development) that guide the ‘spotlight’ under which major funders are looking. This spotlight is not just about these important areas—it’s also shaped by strong intuitions and priors about the value of prestige and the manner in which ideas are presented. While these methodologies have merit, they can create an environment where the kinds of thinking and approaches that align with these expectations are more likely to receive funding. This incentivizes pattern-matching to established norms rather than encouraging genuinely new ideas.
The idea of experimenting with a more democratic distribution of funding, as you suggest, raises an interesting question: would this approach help incentivize and enable more exploration within EA? On one hand, by decentralizing decision-making and involving the broader community in cause area selection, such a model could potentially diversify the types of projects that receive funding. This could help break the current pattern-matching incentives, allowing for a wider array of ideas to be explored and tested, particularly those that might not align with the established priorities of major funders.
However, there are significant challenges to consider. New and unconventional ideas often require deeper analysis and nuanced understanding, which may not be easily accessible to participants in a direct democratic process. The reality is that many people, even within the EA community, might not have the time or expertise to thoroughly evaluate novel ideas. As a result, they may default to allocating funds toward causes and approaches they are already familiar with, rather than taking the risk on something unproven or less understood.
In light of this, a more ‘republican’ system, where the community plays a role in selecting qualified assessors who are tasked with evaluating new ideas and allocating funds, might offer a better balance. Such a system would allow for informed decision-making while still reflecting the community’s values and priorities. These assessors could be chosen based on their expertise and commitment to exploring a wide range of ideas, thereby ensuring that unconventional or nascent ideas receive the consideration they deserve. This approach could combine the benefits of broad community input with the depth of analysis needed to make wise funding decisions, potentially leading to a richer diversity of projects being supported and a more dynamic, exploratory EA ecosystem.
Ultimately, while direct democratic funding models have the potential to diversify funding, they also risk reinforcing existing biases towards familiar ideas. A more structured approach, where the community helps select knowledgeable assessors, might strike a better balance between exploration and empirical rigor, ensuring that new and unconventional ideas have a fair chance to develop and prove their worth.
EDIT:
I wanted to clarify that I recognize the ‘republic’ nature in your proposal, where fund managers have the discretion to determine how best to advance the selected cause areas. My suggestion builds on this by advocating for even greater flexibility for these representatives. Specifically, I propose that the community selects assessors who would have broader autonomy not just to optimize within established areas but to explore and fund unconventional or emerging ideas that might not yet have strong empirical support. This could help ensure a more dynamic and innovative approach to funding within the EA community.
I like this also, I can imagine a system with a few mainstream assessors (or coalitions thereof) representing the major causes in the movement, and then small-scale ones who get access to better funding to develop smaller causes.
Although, I think both suffer from that same domination of the majority. Ultimately, if there aren’t people in the community willing to vote for the newer causes, they won’t get funded under either system.
I would have a lot less concern about more central control of funding within EA if there was more genuine interest within those funding circles for broad exploration and development of evidence from new ideas within the community. Currently, I think there are a handful of (very good) notions about areas that are the most promising (anthropogenic short-term existential or major risks like AI, nuclear weapons, pandemics/bioweapons, animal welfare, global health, and development) that guide the ‘spotlight’ under which major funders are looking. This spotlight is not just about these important areas—it’s also shaped by strong intuitions and priors about the value of prestige and the manner in which ideas are presented. While these methodologies have merit, they can create an environment where the kinds of thinking and approaches that align with these expectations are more likely to receive funding. This incentivizes pattern-matching to established norms rather than encouraging genuinely new ideas.
The idea of experimenting with a more democratic distribution of funding, as you suggest, raises an interesting question: would this approach help incentivize and enable more exploration within EA? On one hand, by decentralizing decision-making and involving the broader community in cause area selection, such a model could potentially diversify the types of projects that receive funding. This could help break the current pattern-matching incentives, allowing for a wider array of ideas to be explored and tested, particularly those that might not align with the established priorities of major funders.
However, there are significant challenges to consider. New and unconventional ideas often require deeper analysis and nuanced understanding, which may not be easily accessible to participants in a direct democratic process. The reality is that many people, even within the EA community, might not have the time or expertise to thoroughly evaluate novel ideas. As a result, they may default to allocating funds toward causes and approaches they are already familiar with, rather than taking the risk on something unproven or less understood.
In light of this, a more ‘republican’ system, where the community plays a role in selecting qualified assessors who are tasked with evaluating new ideas and allocating funds, might offer a better balance. Such a system would allow for informed decision-making while still reflecting the community’s values and priorities. These assessors could be chosen based on their expertise and commitment to exploring a wide range of ideas, thereby ensuring that unconventional or nascent ideas receive the consideration they deserve. This approach could combine the benefits of broad community input with the depth of analysis needed to make wise funding decisions, potentially leading to a richer diversity of projects being supported and a more dynamic, exploratory EA ecosystem.
Ultimately, while direct democratic funding models have the potential to diversify funding, they also risk reinforcing existing biases towards familiar ideas. A more structured approach, where the community helps select knowledgeable assessors, might strike a better balance between exploration and empirical rigor, ensuring that new and unconventional ideas have a fair chance to develop and prove their worth.
EDIT:
I wanted to clarify that I recognize the ‘republic’ nature in your proposal, where fund managers have the discretion to determine how best to advance the selected cause areas. My suggestion builds on this by advocating for even greater flexibility for these representatives. Specifically, I propose that the community selects assessors who would have broader autonomy not just to optimize within established areas but to explore and fund unconventional or emerging ideas that might not yet have strong empirical support. This could help ensure a more dynamic and innovative approach to funding within the EA community.
I like this also, I can imagine a system with a few mainstream assessors (or coalitions thereof) representing the major causes in the movement, and then small-scale ones who get access to better funding to develop smaller causes.
Although, I think both suffer from that same domination of the majority. Ultimately, if there aren’t people in the community willing to vote for the newer causes, they won’t get funded under either system.