EDAs are a problem for non-naturalistic moral realists in the British tradition (e.g. Sidgwick, Parfit). Some people think they’re a problem for naturalistic moral realists too.
I’ve read ~10 philosophy papers that try to defend non-naturalistic moral realism against EDAs.
More than half of these defences have the following structure:
(P1) Metaethical claim about moral truth.
(P2) EDAs are incompatible with (P1).
(P3) Conclusion: EDAs are false.
A typical metaethical claim for (P1):
(P1*) The normative and the descriptive are fundamentally different (bangs table).
According to me, we should just accept EDAs and reject dubious versions of (P1).
Peter—yep, that’s also my impression so far, that philosophers seem compelled to reject evo debunking arguments because EDAs would render much of moral philosophy’s game (trying to systematize & reconcile moral intuitions) both incoherent and irrelevant. So they seem to be scrambling for ad hoc reasons to reject EDAs by any means necessary… and end up promoting spurious arguments.
But, I could be wrong, and there might be some more compelling, principled, and less reactive critiques of EDAs out there.
On the contrary, non-naturalistic moral realists such as Derek Parfit and Peter Singer note that evolutionary debunking arguments tend to strengthen (some forms of) non-natural moral realism. On an evolutionary account, external reasons for belief and action would seem to be redundant (pure impulse would suffice), yet Parfit and Singer argue for their existence.
EDAs are a problem for non-naturalistic moral realists in the British tradition (e.g. Sidgwick, Parfit). Some people think they’re a problem for naturalistic moral realists too.
I’ve read ~10 philosophy papers that try to defend non-naturalistic moral realism against EDAs.
More than half of these defences have the following structure:
A typical metaethical claim for (P1):
According to me, we should just accept EDAs and reject dubious versions of (P1).
Peter—yep, that’s also my impression so far, that philosophers seem compelled to reject evo debunking arguments because EDAs would render much of moral philosophy’s game (trying to systematize & reconcile moral intuitions) both incoherent and irrelevant. So they seem to be scrambling for ad hoc reasons to reject EDAs by any means necessary… and end up promoting spurious arguments.
But, I could be wrong, and there might be some more compelling, principled, and less reactive critiques of EDAs out there.
On the contrary, non-naturalistic moral realists such as Derek Parfit and Peter Singer note that evolutionary debunking arguments tend to strengthen (some forms of) non-natural moral realism. On an evolutionary account, external reasons for belief and action would seem to be redundant (pure impulse would suffice), yet Parfit and Singer argue for their existence.