Executive summary: The inefficacy argument, which denies individual moral responsibility for factory farming due to the negligible impact of single consumer choices, fails under consequentialist scrutiny, as expected ham calculations and the influence of social norms indicate significant indirect responsibility, particularly for individuals with greater influence.
Key points:
Inefficacy argument and factory farming – The argument that individual consumption of animal products does not causally contribute to factory farming is analogous to similar claims in climate change debates.
Moral responsibility frameworks – Sinnot-Armstrong’s arguments against individual responsibility rely on sufficiency, necessity, and intent, but rejecting intent as a factor still leaves individuals morally responsible through expected harm calculations.
Expected harm and probabilities – Even if individual purchases only occasionally trigger changes in supply, expected value theory (EV) suggests that consumers bear significant moral responsibility for animal suffering.
Plausible probability alternative – A threshold-based approach to moral responsibility (assigning blame only when a risk surpasses a certain probability) still condemns habitual consumption of animal products.
Collective inaction and influence – If moral responsibility includes preventing avoidable harm, then influential individuals, such as academics, bear even greater responsibility for advocating against factory farming due to their potential societal impact.
Conclusion – Attempts to justify individual consumption of animal products within a consequentialist framework fail, as even those rejecting direct causation remain responsible for preventable harm through their choices and influence.
This comment was auto-generated by the EA Forum Team. Feel free to point out issues with this summary by replying to the comment, and contact us if you have feedback.
Executive summary: The inefficacy argument, which denies individual moral responsibility for factory farming due to the negligible impact of single consumer choices, fails under consequentialist scrutiny, as expected ham calculations and the influence of social norms indicate significant indirect responsibility, particularly for individuals with greater influence.
Key points:
Inefficacy argument and factory farming – The argument that individual consumption of animal products does not causally contribute to factory farming is analogous to similar claims in climate change debates.
Moral responsibility frameworks – Sinnot-Armstrong’s arguments against individual responsibility rely on sufficiency, necessity, and intent, but rejecting intent as a factor still leaves individuals morally responsible through expected harm calculations.
Expected harm and probabilities – Even if individual purchases only occasionally trigger changes in supply, expected value theory (EV) suggests that consumers bear significant moral responsibility for animal suffering.
Plausible probability alternative – A threshold-based approach to moral responsibility (assigning blame only when a risk surpasses a certain probability) still condemns habitual consumption of animal products.
Collective inaction and influence – If moral responsibility includes preventing avoidable harm, then influential individuals, such as academics, bear even greater responsibility for advocating against factory farming due to their potential societal impact.
Conclusion – Attempts to justify individual consumption of animal products within a consequentialist framework fail, as even those rejecting direct causation remain responsible for preventable harm through their choices and influence.
This comment was auto-generated by the EA Forum Team. Feel free to point out issues with this summary by replying to the comment, and contact us if you have feedback.