I tried to describe some possible examples in the post. Maybe strong longtermists should have less trust in scientific consensus, since they should act as if the scientific consensus is wrong on some fundamental issues (e.g. on the 2nd law of thermodynamics, faster than light travel prohibition). Although I think you could make a good argument that this goes too far.
I think the example about humanity’s ability to coordinate might be more decision-relevant. If you need to act as if humanity will be able to overcome global challenges and spread through the galaxy, given the chance, then I think that is going to have relevance for the prioritisation of different existential risks. You will overestimate humanity’s ability to coordinate relative to if you didn’t make that conditioning, and that might lead you to, say, be less worried about climate change.
I agree that it makes this post much less convincing that I can’t describe a clear cut example though. Possibly that’s a reason to not be as worried about this issue. But to me, the fact that “allows for a strong future” should almost always dominate “probably true” as a principle for choosing between beliefs to adopt, intuitively feels like it must be decision-relevant.
I tried to describe some possible examples in the post. Maybe strong longtermists should have less trust in scientific consensus, since they should act as if the scientific consensus is wrong on some fundamental issues (e.g. on the 2nd law of thermodynamics, faster than light travel prohibition). Although I think you could make a good argument that this goes too far.
I think the example about humanity’s ability to coordinate might be more decision-relevant. If you need to act as if humanity will be able to overcome global challenges and spread through the galaxy, given the chance, then I think that is going to have relevance for the prioritisation of different existential risks. You will overestimate humanity’s ability to coordinate relative to if you didn’t make that conditioning, and that might lead you to, say, be less worried about climate change.
I agree that it makes this post much less convincing that I can’t describe a clear cut example though. Possibly that’s a reason to not be as worried about this issue. But to me, the fact that “allows for a strong future” should almost always dominate “probably true” as a principle for choosing between beliefs to adopt, intuitively feels like it must be decision-relevant.