I think you’ve failed to think on the margin here. I agree that the broad classes of regulation you point to here have *netted out* badly, but this says little about what the most thoughtful and determined actors in these spaces have achieved.
Classically, Germany’s early 2000s investments in solar R&D had enormous positive externalities on climate and the people who pushed for those didn’t have to support restricting nuclear power also. The option space for them was not “the net-bad energy policy that emerged” vs “libertarian paradise;” it was: “the existing/inevitable bad policies with a bet on solar R&D” vs “the existing/inevitable bad policies with no bet on solar R&D.”
I believe most EAs treat their engagement with AI policy as researching and advocating for narrow policies tailored to mitigate catastrophic risk. In this sense, they’re acting as an organized/expert interest group motivated by a good, even popular per some polls, view of the public interest. They are competing with rather than complementing the more selfishly motivated interest groups seeking the kind of influence the oil & gas industry did in the climate context. On your model of regulation, this seems like a wise strategy, perhaps the only viable one. Again the alternative is not no regulation, but regulation that leaves out the best, most prosocial ideas.
To the extent you’re trying to warn EAs not to indiscriminately cheer any AI policy proposal assuming it will help with x-risk, I agree with you. I don’t however agree that’s reflective of how they’re treating the issue.
Yes that’s fair. I do think that even specific advocacy can have risks though. Most advocacy is motivated by AI fear which can be picked up and used to support lots of other bad policies, e.g how Sam Altaman was received in congress.
I think you’ve failed to think on the margin here. I agree that the broad classes of regulation you point to here have *netted out* badly, but this says little about what the most thoughtful and determined actors in these spaces have achieved.
Classically, Germany’s early 2000s investments in solar R&D had enormous positive externalities on climate and the people who pushed for those didn’t have to support restricting nuclear power also. The option space for them was not “the net-bad energy policy that emerged” vs “libertarian paradise;” it was: “the existing/inevitable bad policies with a bet on solar R&D” vs “the existing/inevitable bad policies with no bet on solar R&D.”
I believe most EAs treat their engagement with AI policy as researching and advocating for narrow policies tailored to mitigate catastrophic risk. In this sense, they’re acting as an organized/expert interest group motivated by a good, even popular per some polls, view of the public interest. They are competing with rather than complementing the more selfishly motivated interest groups seeking the kind of influence the oil & gas industry did in the climate context. On your model of regulation, this seems like a wise strategy, perhaps the only viable one. Again the alternative is not no regulation, but regulation that leaves out the best, most prosocial ideas.
To the extent you’re trying to warn EAs not to indiscriminately cheer any AI policy proposal assuming it will help with x-risk, I agree with you. I don’t however agree that’s reflective of how they’re treating the issue.
Yes that’s fair. I do think that even specific advocacy can have risks though. Most advocacy is motivated by AI fear which can be picked up and used to support lots of other bad policies, e.g how Sam Altaman was received in congress.