I think it’s useful to add some quantitative intuitions here:
Quick BOTEC:
In the US there’s a 50% chance a candidate not committed to democracy will become President, in Germany a party not being committed to democracy is part of the next government is very low, certainly not more than 0.5% (>=100x difference). There are certainly other ways to think about this, but I think the basic captured intuition—despite all the turmoil the threat to German democracy is low, in absolute terms and comparatively—seems correct (and, indeed, the recent protests seem a vindication of that; there is now a strong pro-democracy response even absent EA funding)
US democracy is obviously much more important than German, by population this would be 4x, if we think about other ways this matters (global signaling and erosion of norms etc) the difference would probably be somewhat larger still.
Much more money in US philanthropy so maybe funding additionality in US would be somewhat lower (/2x?)
Much more money in US philanthropy so maybe a /10x additional discount for lower neglectedness (less low hanging fruit left etc.)
100*4/2*10 = 20x differential in favor of US > Germany even on assumptions that seem biased towards Germany
It seems likely one will get to similar differentials from non-Germany > Germany in countries that are smaller but where democracy is threatened more than in the US and funding additionality and neglectedness are higher than in Germany.
Some implications of this:
(1) It seems quite important to avoid lock-in to Germany. I know you talk about this, but initial grants (and then reporting on those grants) do set up expectations.
(2) Even with minimal or no research one could probably already make grants that would dominate a German portfolio of well-known German orgs (which the current recs are), e.g. picking the cursory best orgs one can support philanthropically as a foreigner in, say, US, Hungary, Turkey, etc.
I think it’s useful to add some quantitative intuitions here:
Quick BOTEC:
In the US there’s a 50% chance a candidate not committed to democracy will become President, in Germany a party not being committed to democracy is part of the next government is very low, certainly not more than 0.5% (>=100x difference). There are certainly other ways to think about this, but I think the basic captured intuition—despite all the turmoil the threat to German democracy is low, in absolute terms and comparatively—seems correct (and, indeed, the recent protests seem a vindication of that; there is now a strong pro-democracy response even absent EA funding)
US democracy is obviously much more important than German, by population this would be 4x, if we think about other ways this matters (global signaling and erosion of norms etc) the difference would probably be somewhat larger still.
Much more money in US philanthropy so maybe funding additionality in US would be somewhat lower (/2x?)
Much more money in US philanthropy so maybe a /10x additional discount for lower neglectedness (less low hanging fruit left etc.)
100*4/2*10 = 20x differential in favor of US > Germany even on assumptions that seem biased towards Germany
It seems likely one will get to similar differentials from non-Germany > Germany in countries that are smaller but where democracy is threatened more than in the US and funding additionality and neglectedness are higher than in Germany.
Some implications of this:
(1) It seems quite important to avoid lock-in to Germany. I know you talk about this, but initial grants (and then reporting on those grants) do set up expectations.
(2) Even with minimal or no research one could probably already make grants that would dominate a German portfolio of well-known German orgs (which the current recs are), e.g. picking the cursory best orgs one can support philanthropically as a foreigner in, say, US, Hungary, Turkey, etc.