I like this phrasing, but maybe not for the reason you propose it.
“Doing the most good” leaves implicit what is good, but still uses a referent (“good”) that everyone thinks they know what it means. I think this issue is made even clearer if we talk about “optimizing Earth” instead since optimization must always be optimizing for something. That is, optimization is inherently measured and is about maximization/minimization of some measure. Even when we try to have a generic notion of optimal we still really mean something like effective or efficient as in optimizing for effectiveness or optimizing for efficiency.
But if EA is about optimizing Earth or doing the most good, we must still tackle the problem of what is worth optimizing for and what is good. You mention impact, which also sounds a lot to me like some combination of effectiveness and productivity multiplied by effect size, yet when we are this vague that makes EA more of a productivity movement and less of a good doing movement, whatever we may think good is. The trouble is that, exposing the hollowness of ethical content in the message, it makes it unclear what things would not benefit from being part of EA.
To take a repugnant example, if I thought maximizing suffering were good, would I still be part of EA since I want to optimize the Earth (for suffering)?
I like this phrasing, but maybe not for the reason you propose it.
“Doing the most good” leaves implicit what is good, but still uses a referent (“good”) that everyone thinks they know what it means. I think this issue is made even clearer if we talk about “optimizing Earth” instead since optimization must always be optimizing for something. That is, optimization is inherently measured and is about maximization/minimization of some measure. Even when we try to have a generic notion of optimal we still really mean something like effective or efficient as in optimizing for effectiveness or optimizing for efficiency.
But if EA is about optimizing Earth or doing the most good, we must still tackle the problem of what is worth optimizing for and what is good. You mention impact, which also sounds a lot to me like some combination of effectiveness and productivity multiplied by effect size, yet when we are this vague that makes EA more of a productivity movement and less of a good doing movement, whatever we may think good is. The trouble is that, exposing the hollowness of ethical content in the message, it makes it unclear what things would not benefit from being part of EA.
To take a repugnant example, if I thought maximizing suffering were good, would I still be part of EA since I want to optimize the Earth (for suffering)?
The best attempt at dealing with this issue has, for me, been Brian Tomasik’s looks at dealing with moral multiplicity and compromise.