Executive summary: In this exploratory and polemical essay, Silas Abrahamsen argues that insect suffering is either overwhelmingly important or entirely negligible—there is no reasonable middle ground—and that failing to take it seriously is often a result of bias, intuition-driven moral error, and discomfort with the implications of scale.
Key points:
Insect suffering is either of paramount or negligible moral importance—given their vast numbers and potential for intense pain, moderate concern is irrational and incoherent.
Human activities, even ordinary ones like driving or donating to human-focused charities, inadvertently affect insect populations on a massive scale, potentially making insect welfare the dominant moral consideration.
Arguments for ignoring insect suffering typically rest on intuitions or convenience, but these break down under scrutiny and lead to implausible or morally troubling conclusions.
If insects do live good lives, that still implies radical conclusions—such as that environmental destruction is catastrophically bad due to lost insect well-being.
Moral intuitions shaped without awareness of insect-scale suffering are unreliable, and ethical reasoning should adjust to empirical reality, however strange or unsettling it may be.
The post draws an analogy to Christianity’s claim of infinite stakes—in both cases, moderate concern is untenable if the underlying assumptions are taken seriously.
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Executive summary: In this exploratory and polemical essay, Silas Abrahamsen argues that insect suffering is either overwhelmingly important or entirely negligible—there is no reasonable middle ground—and that failing to take it seriously is often a result of bias, intuition-driven moral error, and discomfort with the implications of scale.
Key points:
Insect suffering is either of paramount or negligible moral importance—given their vast numbers and potential for intense pain, moderate concern is irrational and incoherent.
Human activities, even ordinary ones like driving or donating to human-focused charities, inadvertently affect insect populations on a massive scale, potentially making insect welfare the dominant moral consideration.
Arguments for ignoring insect suffering typically rest on intuitions or convenience, but these break down under scrutiny and lead to implausible or morally troubling conclusions.
If insects do live good lives, that still implies radical conclusions—such as that environmental destruction is catastrophically bad due to lost insect well-being.
Moral intuitions shaped without awareness of insect-scale suffering are unreliable, and ethical reasoning should adjust to empirical reality, however strange or unsettling it may be.
The post draws an analogy to Christianity’s claim of infinite stakes—in both cases, moderate concern is untenable if the underlying assumptions are taken seriously.
This comment was auto-generated by the EA Forum Team. Feel free to point out issues with this summary by replying to the comment, and contact us if you have feedback.